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Since the seventeenth century, when the concept of rights
first came into vogue, philosophers and social theorists have
struggled to articulate an acceptable theory of individual rights,
but their efforts remain largely unsatisfactory. Without excep-
tion, each effort falters when it attempts to describe the con-
tours of the rights that are entitled to protection or to explain
the ways in which competing claims of right should interact.
This is true whether a theorist seeks to define a right through
reference to its substantive content or through reference to the
procedures by which the right can be recognized. Given the
collective stature of rights theorists, however, it is unlikely that
their efforts have failed due to any lack of intelligence or crea-
tivity. Rather, the persistent failure of rights theory suggests
that we have done just about all that can be done from within
the analytical paradigm that has governed rational discourse to
date.
The present paradigm is characterized by a brand of ration-
ality that depends heavily upon language and logic. Whether
the rights under discussion are legal or moral, positive or natu-
ral, language defines the rights and logic determines the conse-
quences that flow from the linguistic definitions. The subtle
distinctions and elusive comparisons demanded by a mature
theory of rights, however, tax the capabilities of language and
logic beyond their limits. Language is too inarticulate and logic
too incomplete to serve as the chief components of a medium
for rights analysis. Nevertheless, when analytical inadequacies
do emerge, theorists try to overcome them with even more lan-
guage and even greater logical rigor. But such efforts tend to
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be counterproductive because an inverse relationship is likely
to exist between language and logic on the one hand and useful
conceptualization on the other. The more we talk about rights,
at least in the analytical language that we presently employ,
the more likely we are to introduce distracting distortions and
the less likely we are ever to capture the concept. Although a
coherent concept of rights ultimately may prove to be available,
like a secret, we may never be able to actually say what it is.
As a result, it may be time to try a new paradigm.
The new paradigm that I have in mind reconceives analyti-
cal use of language and de-emphasizes analytical reliance on
logic. Rather than attempting to approximate ineffable con-
cepts through expository description, the new paradigm uses
language in a literary sense to evoke such concepts directly.
The contemplated paradigm de-emphasizes logic because the
conceptual premises on which logical operations depend often
elude the type of binary reduction required for logical evalua-
tion. Consistent with modernist schools of thought that have
begun to influence analytical as well as artistic disciplines, a
reconceived set of analytical conventions may permit our no-
tion of rationality to keep pace with our increasingly nonratio-
nal perceptions. Continued insistence on the present criteria of
rationality, however, will serve only to impede our analytical
growth.
Part I of this Essay begins by describing the essence of a
theory of rights and demonstrates how the manipulation of lan-
guage and logic can render the concept of rights too intractable
to be coherent. Next, to deflect the suggestion that the prob-
lem is an artifact of the particular theory chosen for considera-
tion, Part I performs similar manipulations on alternative
theories of rights. The results suggest that the difficulty stems
not from problems with the theories themselves but rather
from problems inherent in the analytical conventions from
which the theories emanate. Part II then examines the present
use of language and logic in connection with rational analysis,
demonstrating that both have limitations making them vulner-
able to a variety of destabilizing analytical manipulations. Part
II next presents a reconceived notion of language and logic that
facilitates a modernist approach to rational analysis, with the
enhanced conceptual freedom that modernism permits. Fi-
nally, Part III argues that continued suppression of the present
limitations on our analytical abilities will only delay the shift to
a new analytical paradigm that can provide qualitatively more
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satisfying modes of conceptualization than are presently
possible.
I. THE INTRACTABLE ESSENCE OF RIGHTS
A. ANTIMAJORITARIANISM
The essence of a theory of rights lies in its capacity to me-
diate the tension between the individual and society. If individ-
uals existed in isolation, the concept of a right would be
superfluous; each individual would have absolute autonomy. A
society of two or more individuals, however, creates the poten-
tial for divergence between individual interests and the collec-
tive good. All theories of rights attempt to resolve the conflicts
that arise from this divergence. Even a conflict between two
individuals, which might initially appear to be wholly private, is
essentially a conflict between the individual and society. A
claim of right asserted by one of the individuals against the
other has meaning only to the extent that society is prepared to
intervene on behalf of.the claimant, thereby transforming the
nominally private dispute into a conflict between individual and
collective interests.' Central to any theory of rights, therefore,
is its prescription for dealing with the conflict that inevitably
exists between the individual and society.
A theory of individual rights resolves the conflict between
individual and collective interests by elevating certain individ-
ual interests to the status of rights and then placing them be-
yond the reach of societal abrogation, even when abrogation
would serve the collective good.2 In a democracy, the will of
1. If a private actor threatens to violate the rights of another private in-
dividual, any claim of right asserted by the latter exists not only against the
private actor but also extends to the state-the society. Depending on the na-
ture of the right involved, the claim against the state may consist of an entitle-
ment to affirmative state protection or freedom from state interference with
the individual's attempts at self-defense. Regardless of the form, some specifi-
cation of the state's role appears necessary to any complete description of the
scope of an individual right.
2. The proposition seems self-evident, but for a sophisticated derivation
see Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 172-81 (1984).
Virtually all moral and legal theories of individual rights provide some sort of
immunization from societal abrogation. Natural rights theories presuppose a
hard type of immunity under which a right is simply beyond the reach of juris-
tic modification. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130
(1977) (judicial decisions must enforce existing rights); J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 3-6, 54-65 (1971) (justice requires that society cannot override cer-
tain individual rights). Although positivist accounts of individual rights confer
a softer, more context-dependent immunity, nobody can properly reject a
claim of right made within a given legal framework as long as the society re-
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the majority is said to determine the collective good. As a re-
sult, the essence of an individual right in a democratic society is
its ability to override the majority's will to interfere with the
exercise of that right.3 Although the source and scope of an in-
dividual right can be problematic, once a right is recognized, no
collective interest of society falling within the scope of that
right properly can defeat it. By hypothesis, then, an individual
right has the essential capacity to be antimajoritarian-to su-
persede the will of the majority.
As defined, the concept of an individual right becomes in-
coherent. Because the collective power of the majority super-
sedes the power of the individual, individual rights can exist
only if the majority chooses not to exercise its superior power
in a way that interferes with the individual right. If the major-
ity chooses to honor rather than reject a claim of right, how-
ever, the claim is no longer antimajoritarian. Instead, it is
simply an interest endorsed by the majority, and its classifica-
tion as a right becomes superfluous. Majority endorsement pre-
cludes the interest from being an individual right by depriving
it of the capacity to be antimajoritarian. Although the essence
of an individual right consists of its ability to supersede the will
of the majority, in fact, it can never do so. An individual right,
therefore, lacks essential content.
To avoid the antimajoritarian dilemma, it is possible to as-
sert that a right is something to which the majority always de-
fers even though, in a particular circumstance, it would prefer
not to do so. By definition, however, the majority prefers to do
whatever it does. Indeed, the best measure of the majority's
preference with respect to a particular issue is the way in
which the majority permits the issue to be resolved.4 A resolu-
tains the conviction that rejection would be improper. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 50-60 (1961) (rules are obeyed only if the underlying princi-
ple is accepted); see also J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 175-83 (2d
ed. 1980) (understanding the laws instituting rights is a precondition to defin-
ing rights). At the realist extreme of the positivist spectrum, where individual
rights are simply defined in a post hoc manner to be those interests that soci-
ety for whatever reason has chosen to protect, the concept of immunity begins
to crumble. As the discussion in the text infra accompanying notes 3-10 dem-
onstrates, however, the concept of rights itself begins to crumble as well.
3. The present analysis is in no way dependent upon the accuracy of this
characterization. One could substitute the term "monarch," "dictator," or
"power holder" for the term "majority" without affecting the point being
advanced.
4. Other, nonpositivist measures of the will of the majority concerning
an issue are possible, of course, but they are extremely problematic. Such
measures entail difficulties in determining how the issue should be presented,
[Vol. 71:669
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tion that corresponds to popular opinion obviously accords with
the majority's preference. But even a resolution that appears
to conflict with popular opinion in reality represents the prefer-
ence of the majority. In such a case, the majority has simply
authorized a procedure for issue resolution that is capable of
producing results that conflict with popular opinion. Presuma-
bly, the majority authorized the procedure in the belief that it
advances the majority's own long-term interests more than
would deference to the immediate demands of public opinion.
As long as the majority continues to favor the procedure that it
has authorized, any outcome produced by that procedure neces-
sarily corresponds to the preference of the majority.5 Accord-
ingly, the suggestion that a right corresponds to the majority's
decision to override its own preferences does not avoid the an-
timajoritarian dilemma; the majority cannot override its own
preferences unless its own preference is to do so. 6
Arguably, one could avoid the antimajoritarian dilemma
simply by denying a claim of right because the very act of ma-
jority denial would make the right antimajoritarian. This sug-
gestion gives antimajoritarian content to the concept of rights,
however, only by depriving the concept of any consequence.
The idea that a claimed entitlement can become a right solely
by dooming it to denial is inconsistent with the common con-
ception that claims of right are capable of acceptance as well as
whose preferences should count, whether all preferences should count equally,
whether the issue is understood in the same way by all those expressing a
preference, whether the preferences as interpreted correspond to the prefer-
ences as expressed, and so on. These difficulties are minimized, although not
completely avoided, by using a positivist measure of the majority's will.
5. Even if the prescribed procedure is not complied with in a given case,
the issue will nevertheless have been resolved in accordance with the major-
ity's preference. The majority will simply have preferred whatever resolution
results to the expenditure of additional resources necessary for a higher de-
gree of procedural regularity.
6. One might also argue that the concept of shifting majorities permits a
right to be antimajoritarian and yet be honored by the majority. Because the
position of the majority on any given issue can be determined by coalitions
who join forces for different reasons, a majority made up of one coalition may
reject the existence of a right in the abstract, whereas a majority made up of a
different coalition may honor a particular assertion of that right in a particular
context. Rather than establishing that the right has performed the logically
impossible task of being antimajoritarian while being honored by the majority,
however, the shifting majority phenomenon merely illustrates one of the diffi-
culties involved in using a nonpositivist measure to determine the will of the
majority. See supra note 4. Once a particular positive test is selected for as-
certaining the will of the majority, the antimajoritarian dilemma reappears in
full force.
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wrongful denial. Moreover, unless a right has some nontrivial
consequence, the concept of rights becomes a meaningless ab-
straction, hardly meriting the ink or blood that has been spilled
over it.
Recognition may not be the only route by which a claim of
right can have consequence. Because claims of right are essen-
tially assertions of arguments in favor of adopting particular
positions for a particular reason, they can have the moral force
necessary to prompt action or to change attitudes, even though
the majority ultimately rejects them. Indeed, revolutions have
been fought precisely because claims of right were rejected.
Accordingly, if the act of asserting a right has significant collat-
eral consequence despite denial of the right itself, the coher-
ence of the concept of rights might be salvaged. Denial would
preserve the antimajoritarian content of the right, while the
collateral consequence would prevent the right from becoming
a meaningless abstraction.
Notwithstanding its superficial appeal, this proposed strat-
egy for avoiding the antimajoritarian dilemma actually com-
pounds rather than ameliorates the problem of incoherence.
Based on the consequences that may flow from asserting a
claim of right, the strategy impermissibly confuses rights with
mere claims of rights.7 A right is an actual interest. A claim of
right, however, is simply a rhetorical device. It represents a
particular type of argument, asserting that an interest is too im-
portant to be left in the hands of the potentially unreliable ma-
jority.8  Although the concept of rights often may have
rhetorical value in formulating such arguments, that does noth-
ing to salvage the coherence of the underlying concept. More-
7. Rights and claims of right do not necessarily coincide. Many claims of
right are invalid precisely because they do not rest on actual underlying rights.
As a positive matter, the only way to distinguish between valid and invalid
claims of right is to determine whether the majority honors a claim. If the
majority finds the claim sufficiently compelling to honor it, the claim is valid.
Once again, however, the act of recognition deprives the asserted interest of
the capacity to be antimajoritarian.
8. A claim of right "works" by using antimajoritarianism as a measure of
importance. The claim asserts that an interest is so important that not even
the majority should be permitted to interfere with it for the collective good.
As a rhetorical matter, to call something a right is to invoke a tradition of
principled resistance to the exploitation of individual interests for the conven-
ience of a transitory, often tyrannical majority that seeks to advance its own
selfish interests or the interests of its leaders. Assuming that antimajoritari-
anism properly can be used as a rhetorical measure of importance, a claim of
right is not really as much an argument in favor of importance as it is a con-
clusory assertion of importance.
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over, a claim of right has one characteristic that causes it to
compound the problem of incoherence. A claim of right does
not simply represent an argument; it necessarily represents a
bad argument. By asserting that an interest should be placed
beyond the reach of majority abrogation, a claim of right argues
in favor of a meaningless objective. Because individuals can
never get more than the majority is willing to give, a form of
argument premised on the belief that they can rests on an illu-
sory assumption. The concept of rights is troubling enough, but
a claim of right resting on that concept advocates what can
never be more than a vacuous victory.
Rather than resolving the antimajoritarian dilemma, the
claim of right strategy merely raises interesting questions about
the nature of arguments that we sometimes find persuasive. 9
In the final analysis, there is no way to avoid the an-
timajoritarian dilemma because there is no way in which a
right can have any meaning other than the meaning that the
society chooses to give it. Further, because a right cannot exist
independently of its societal endorsement, there is no way to
establish its antimajoritarian essence. As a result, the concept
of an individual right is problematic. It lacks either conse-
quence or antimajoritarian content. For that reason, it also
lacks logical coherence.' 0
If the foregoing analysis seems artificial, that of course is
the point. The analysis generated a counterintuitive conclusion
even though nothing was wrong with the analysis itself. Using
linguistic terms in a way that is consistent with customary us-
9. In this regard, the concept of rights is similar to the concept of equal-
ity as illuminated by Professor Westen. Both are empty vessels, frequently fil-
led with external meaning that is generally mistaken for the meaning of the
vessel itself. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1982) (Equality has no substantive content of its own and derives substance
entirely from claims of rights.). The Westen thesis generated spirited re-
sponse. See Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Wes-
ten, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 576 (1983) (The equality concept is necessary
morally, analytically, and rhetorically.); D'Amato, Is Equality A Totally Empty
Idea? 81 MicH. L. REV. 600, 603 (1983) (Equality has a substantive content of
its own.); Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1167, 1169 (1983) (identifying both formal and substantive principles of equal-
ity). For Professor Westen's reply, see Westen, The Meaning of Equality in
Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 663 (1983).
10. Other strategies that have been used to raise questions about the con-
cept of rights tend to emphasize the necessary indeterminacy of the concept
rather than its incoherence. See, e.g., Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 1363, 1371-80 (1984). For a variety of left-leaning critiques of the concept
of rights by critical legal scholars, see Symposium; A Critique of Rights, 62
TEx. L. REv. 1363 (1984).
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age, the analysis formulated a series of analytical premises
which, consistent with customary rigor, generated a particular
logical conclusion. The conclusion, nevertheless, seems unac-
ceptable. Adherence to a rational analytical paradigm as pres-
ently conceived, however, inevitably leads to the conclusion
that the concept of individual rights is fatally flawed. Con-
versely, adherence to the concept of individual rights requires
one to step outside of the rational paradigm and to rely on non-
rational, intuitive modes of argument. Adherence to both is
precluded because the nature of the analytical paradigm that
presently governs our rational discourse precludes nonrational
factors like intuitions from dictating the acceptability of conclu-
sions. Indeed, the very appeal of rational analysis is that it
frees us from the biases and predispositions inherent in our
nonrational intuitions.
One might argue that the foregoing analysis contains
flaws-a concept not fully articulated or a term whose defini-
tion went a little awry. Language rarely operates with such
precision that it can eliminate all slippage between terminology
and the concepts that the terminology represents. For every as-
serted flaw, however, an additional manipulation could be fash-
ioned sufficient, both to eliminate the problem and to force
another choice between counterintuitive rationality on the one
hand and nonrational intuitions on the other.1 1 Obviously, it is
difficult to prove such a proposition in a unilateral presenta-
tion, so I will try to do the next best thing. I will offer addi-
tional examples of analytical dilemmas, in the context of
alternative formulations of rights theory, in the hope of invit-
ing extrapolation to the conclusion that there are problems
with the present paradigm.
11. For example, a colleague suggested that the foregoing problem could
be avoided simply by defining rights to correspond to the second-order prefer-
ences of the majority rather than insisting that rights be antimajoritarian. The
present objective, however, is not to argue that any particular rights formula-
tion is better than any other. Nor is it to deny that particular analytical ma-
nipulations can be sidestepped by reformulating initial premises. Rather, the
point is that analytical manipulations can always be performed once the initial
premises have been specified and locked in. If, for example, a second-order-
preference formulation were settled upon as the definition of a right, the ensu-
ing manipulations might first point out that the definition precluded the exist-
ence of any form of natural rights and might then go on to question whether
there was really a meaningful difference between first- and second-order pref-
erences and, if so, whether one set of preferences was really more deserving of
deference than the other. Wherever you start the analysis, you can always
generate a dilemma that will force you back to your intuitions.
[Vol. 71:669
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
B. ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF RIGHTS THEORY
Various formulations of rights theory are possible. One of
the most common formulations is a liberal theory that relies on
fundamental principles to protect individuals from political op-
pression at the hands of the majority. The fundamental princi-
ples on which liberal theory rests are often deemed to
guarantee to the individual certain positive entitlements and to
require affirmative governmental intervention to ensure that
access to those entitlements is not denied through either pri-
vate or official conduct. A second common formulation is a po-
litically more conservative theory that secures to the individual
a sphere of individual autonomy into which the government
cannot properly intrude. This formulation is often referred to
as a negative rights theory because, rather than focusing on
positive entitlements that the government must provide, it em-
phasizes actions that the government should refrain from tak-
ing. A third variant on rights theory posits a communitarian or
collective nature of rights. Although this variant could be char-
acterized as the antithesis of an individual rights theory, it may
simply amount to an alternative strategy for securing the same
ultimate objectives pursued by a theory of individual rights.
Each formulation of rights theory, however, embodies an ana-
lytical dilemma.
1. Liberal Theory
A liberal theory of rights, perhaps the most common con-
temporary formulation of rights theory, recognizes defined ar-
eas of individual liberty as predominating over competing
collective interests.12 To secure the desired degree of an-
12. Liberal theory is liberal in both the philosophical and political senses
of the term. A liberal theory of rights is philosophically liberal because it
adopts the goal of protecting individual liberty as the ultimate justification for
state authority, thereby giving the individual primacy over the state as the
fundamental social unit. Simultaneously embracing the Hobbesian belief that
state intervention is necessary to prevent individuals from exploiting each
other, see T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (A. Lindsay ed. 1950), and the Lockean belief
that the scope of state power must be confined by the people so as to prevent
state denials of individual liberty, see J. LOCKE, Tivo TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT (T. Cook ed. 1947), liberal theory contains an inherent tension with re-
spect to the question of who is ultimately supposed to restrain whom.
Consistently, however, philosophical liberalism does accord primacy to the in-
dividual over the state.
A liberal theory of rights that accords positive entitlements is also politi-
cally liberal, as evidenced by its receptivity to resource redistribution and its
endorsement of the high levels of government activity needed to administer an
1987]
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timajoritarianism, liberal theory tends to define the scope of in-
dividual rights through reference to fundamental principles,
which may or may not be contained in a written document. Be-
cause these fundamental principles have more legal force than
the ordinary political preferences of the majority,1" the major-
ity cannot legally abrogate individual rights. The distinction
between fundamental principles and political expediency is es-
sential to the coherence of a liberal theory of rights, but efforts
to establish the distinction simply produce another analytical
dilemma.
Proper enforcement of individual rights depends upon
proper interpretation of the governing principles. In addition,
to ensure that the majority cannot abrogate an individual right,
the process of interpretation must be free from domination by
political considerations-considerations relating to the prefer-
ences of the majority. As it turns out, however, no nonpolitical
way of ascertaining the meaning of a principle exists. Any
procedure used to determine the meaning of a particular princi-
ple in a particular factual context is political. The princi-
ple/politics dilemma, therefore, precludes an individual right
from being defined without recourse to majoritarian political
considerations.
To demonstrate, consider first that a principle can have no
entitlement program. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 90-94; J. RAwLs,
supra note 2, at 7-16, 60-64, 100-08; P. Edelman, A Judicially Declared Right To
A Minimum "Survival" Income-An Idea Whose Time May Yet Come 74-84
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Minnesota Law Review); Michelman,
The Supreme Court4 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendmen; 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 13-16 (1969) (discussing a
proposition of "minimum protection against economic hardship"). Philosophi-
cal liberalism does not itself specify any given level of government interven-
tion. The concept of liberty could be defined in a laissez-faire manner that
implied minimal government activity, as it was in the seventeenth century era
of Hobbes and Locke. Once the concept of liberty is defined to include positive
entitlements, however, higher levels of government activity become necessary.
The recognition of any significant number of entitlements, whether in the
form of food stamps or Miranda warnings, requires the establishment of an
administrative state to define, implement, and monitor enforcement of the en-
titlement programs. In addition, an entitlement program functions by author-
izing the government to take resources from some individuals who have them
to give resources to other individuals who do not. Because of its tolerance for
such government intrusiveness, the theory of individual rights on which our
present welfare state rests is liberal in the political as well as the philosophical
sense.
13. For example, constitutional provisions reflecting fundamental princi-




consequential meaning independent of its interpretation. To
distinguish between a principle and its interpretation, we would
have to know that a particular interpretation was erroneous.
To deem an interpretation erroneous, however, requires reli-
ance on yet another interpretation. As a result, we would have
succeeded only in selecting among alternative interpretations,
as opposed to distinguishing between a mere interpretation of
principle and its actual content. Even if we were to vest one
decision maker-say the Supreme Court-with interpretive au-
thority superior to that of all others, we would have succeeded
only in allocating power; we would have done nothing to distin-
guish between principles and their interpretations.
If no operative distinction between a principle and its inter-
pretation exists, the question of what constitutes a proper inter-
pretation of principle amounts to a procedural question
concerning which of the competing mechanisms for interpreta-
tion is likely to yield the best result. We tend to reject major-
ity-controlled mechanisms for interpretation because of the
danger that the majority will abrogate the individual right at
stake. Instead, we tend to rely on judges, whom we take great
pains to insulate from majoritarian political influences. Such a
mode of decision making, however, hardly merits characteriza-
tion as principled rather than political. If the majority influ-
ences the judicial interpretation despite our prophylactic
efforts, the judicial decision is merely a political decision mas-
querading as a principled one. Indeed, evidence suggests that
many judicial decisions fall into this category.14
14. The standard of judicial review in constitutional cases is often defer-
ential to majoritarian legislation. For example, the scope of review in substan-
tive due process, economic regulation cases-cases that can be said to involve
fundamental rights relating to property and contract autonomy-is now virtu-
ally nonexistent. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (up-
holding state minimum-wage and maximum-hours legislation after substantive
due process challenge), the Supreme Court abandoned its efforts, commonly
associated with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state
maximum-hours legislation on substantive due process grounds), to scrutinize
the merits of such majoritarian legislation. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-1 to 8-7, at 427-55 (1978). The customary standard
of review in equal protection cases demands only that majoritarian legislation
have a rational basis. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (upholding public school financing scheme based upon
property taxes after equal protection challenge). Even in cases involving fun-
damental rights or suspect classifications, where the nominal standard of re-
view is more demanding, see L. TRIBE, supra, § 16-6, at 1000-02, the will of the
majority may nevertheless control. See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956)
(per curiam) (dismissing on jurisdictional grounds equal protection challenge
to state antimiscegenation statute despite apparent presence of jurisdiction),
1987]
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Moreover, even if a judge manages to avoid majority-influ-
enced interpretations of principle, matters are likely to be
worse rather than better. If majority preferences do not con-
trol the judicial decision, the judge's own preferences, as
colored by any interest groups with whom the judge sympa-
thizes, must control. Even a judge who consciously tries to ig-
nore personal preferences ultimately does nothing more than
sacrifice one personal preference to another less immediate
preference. In such cases, the decisions are "political" in that
they are based on potentially biased considerations of expedi-
ency rather than actual neutral principles, and not even the
safeguards of majority endorsement are present. The only
available options for decision, therefore, appear to be the polit-
ical preferences of the majority or the political preferences of
the judge, neither of which depend on any principle that exists
free of political interpretation.
15
dismissing appeal from, 197 Va. 734, 735, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1956) (finding ju-
risdiction to hear and an adequate record), in response to order of, 350 U.S. 891
(1955) (per curiam) (vacating judgment and remanding case); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding Japanese internment during
World War II after equal protection challenge); see also L. TRIBE, supra, § 3-8,
at 55 (unarticulated institutional considerations may figure heavily in the
Court's refusal to accept jurisdiction in a particular case); id. § 16-6, at 1000,
§ 16-14, at 1013-14 (discussing Korematsu). In addition, justiciability doctrines,
including those relating to standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions,
collusive suits and advisory opinions, often result in deference to majoritarian
legislation by precluding judicial scrutiny of that legislation. See generally L.
TRIBE, supra, §§ 3-7 to 3-29, at 52-114.
Furthermore, a legislative enactment challenged on constitutional grounds
is statistically more likely to be upheld than it is to be struck down. Even dur-
ing the Lochner era, when the Supreme Court was more willing than usual to
invalidate legislation because of its disagreement with the merits of the legisla-
tion, the Court upheld more legislation than it invalidated. See L. TRIBE,
supra, § 8-2, at 435 n.2 and authorities cited therein. For statistics showing the
low number of statutes, especially federal statutes, that were invalidated on
constitutional grounds during various periods throughout our history, see B.
WRIGHT, THE GRowTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW passim (1942).
Such statistics are, of course, vulnerable to categorization difficulties when
statutes are only partially invalidated and they may be viewed as over-inclu-
sive to the extent that they encompass constitutional issues not viewed as im-
plicating individual rights.
15. In an effort to rehabilitate the distinction between politics and princi-
ple, one might argue that although the distinction may be theoretically elusive,
qualitatively distinct ways of making decisions exist as a practical matter.
Even if all decision making is political in some definitional sense, there is nev-
ertheless an important difference between the everyday political expediency
used by Congress in deciding whether to grant a special interest tax exemp-
tion, and the more austere type of decision making engaged in by the Supreme
Court when it makes individual rights determinations. Proponents of this ar-
gument, however, would still have to establish that one mode of decision mak-
[Vol. 71:669
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2. Negative Rights Theory
Negative rights theories seek to promote individual liberty
by defining a private sphere of autonomy and self-determina-
tion surrounding each individual into which neither the govern-
ment nor another individual can permissibly intrude.16 Not
ing was better than the other at protecting individual liberty. There is in fact
no sound basis for making such an assertion.
Because it is meaningless to suggest that one type of interpretation is
more likely than the other to capture the actual content of the principle at is-
sue, the argument must be that one type of interpretation is inherently more
protective of individual liberty than the other. It is, however, difficult to see
how such a claim could be demonstrated. Indeed, if there is any important dif-
ference between the two modes of decision making, it might be that congres-
sional decision making is more protective of individual liberty than is Supreme
Court decision making. Because Congress represents a variety of interests, the
logrolling and other types of political compromise that occur during the legis-
lative process might produce at least some deference to a wide range of indi-
vidual interests. In the more homogeneous Supreme Court, where the justices
represent only a narrow range of individual interests, the decision-making pro-
cess would appear less likely to result in the protection of interests not repre-
sented by the justices themselves.
There is certainly no reason to believe that the Court, as an institutional
matter, is better than Congress at protecting a wide range of individual inter-
ests. Indeed, as an empirical matter, the opposite might be true. Although the
Court sometimes protects the individual interests of poor people, women,
blacks, and other discrete and insular minorities, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DIsTRUsT 145-70 (1980), it does not always do so, see, e.g., cases discussed supra
note 14, and Congress has probably done much more to protect them than has
the Court. For example, the civil rights legislation enacted since 1964 likely
has done more to advance the interests of minorities than have the Court's
constitutional decisions. Indeed, the Court sometimes defines the scope of con-
stitutional protection simply to be coterminous with the scope of statutory pro-
tections. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 132-40, 145 (1976)
(suggesting that Title VII and the equal protection clause afford the same pro-
tection against discrimination). Moreover, the Court has conspicuously de-
clined to protect other individual interests, such as those of homosexuals. See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (rejecting constitutional challenge
to application of criminal sodomy statute to consenting homosexuals); Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (upholding sodomy statutes
challenged by homosexuals). Furthermore, in City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255-58 (1985), the Court declined to
accord heightened scrutiny to legislation affecting the mentally retarded be-
cause it trusted the majority to deal fairly with the problems of the mentally
retarded through legislation. See also Nowak, Resurrecting Realist Jurispru-
dence: The Political Bias of Burger Court Justices, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 549,
618-19 (1983) (arguing that the rights of racial and political minorities are bet-
ter protected through the political process than through reliance on the
Supreme Court). Accordingly, even if different types of political decision mak-
ing exist, no one type is demonstrably better than another at protecting indi-
vidual liberty.
16. The extreme formulation of negative rights theory is libertarianism.
See, e.g., R. NoZICK, ANARcHY, STATE AND UToPIA 33-35 (1974) (discussing lib-
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only must the government itself refrain from intruding into
these spheres of autonomy, but consistent with Hobbesian be-
liefs, if the government is to serve any meaningful function, it
must prevent one individual from intruding into another's
sphere of autonomy. 7 Indeed, the only reason that the govern-
ment exists is to safeguard private spheres of individual
autonomy.1 8
Like other theories of individual rights, a negative rights
theory ultimately succeeds only in producing an analytical di-
lemma that is inescapable without transcending our present an-
alytical paradigm. The viability of a theory of negative rights
depends on the ability to distinguish between occasions for per-
missible and impermissible government intervention into pri-
vate affairs. But such a prescription for government conduct
cannot be written that does not itself violate the government's
obligation to respect spheres of individual autonomy. When-
ever the government protects one individual's autonomy from
intrusion by another, it interferes with the autonomy of the
second individual. If the government takes no action, however,
it is refusing to protect the autonomy of the first individual and
neglecting the only reason for its existence.19 As a result, the
government is stymied.
To avoid this dilemma, one could argue that some govern-
mental failures to respect individual autonomy are permissible
while others are not. Such an argument, however, sacrifices
the very sphere of autonomy that negative rights theory pur-
ports to protect. Any criterion offered to distinguish permissi-
ble from impermissible intervention, if not wholly arbitrary,
would have to rely on some principle. At best, interpretation of
the principle would be the product of a majoritarian political
ertarian constraints against aggression). Negative rights theories are philo-
sophically liberal but politically conservative. They are philosophically liberal
because of their emphasis on individual liberty. The individual rather than the
society remains the primary social unit and the government exists simply to
benefit the individual. Negative rights theories are politically conservative,
however, because of their distaste for redistributive positive entitlements and
their preference for low levels of government activity. Indeed, these theories
claim that the only acceptable justification for any government action at all is
its necessity for the protection of individual autonomy; government action
aimed at redistributive objectives is improper. Id, at 10-25, 149-50.
17. Id. at 10-25.
18. Id. at 10-12.
19. Cf id. at 27-28 (noting this inconsistency in the context of the ul-
traminimal state); Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy




preference. 20 Consequently, the majority would ultimately de-
fine the principle that determined the sphere of protected indi-
vidual interests. The objective of negative rights theory is to
isolate a sphere of autonomy that the majority cannot pene-
trate. Hope of realizing that objective disintegrates, however,
whenever the power to define the boundaries of the sphere
rests with the majority.
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine what type of crite-
rion could ever distinguish between permissible and impermis-
sible government intervention. The most obvious candidate is
one under which an individual who tries to interfere with the
autonomy of another individual relinquishes a personal right to
freedom from government intervention, thereby permitting the
government to protect the autonomy of the victim by interfer-
ing with the actions of the offender. That distinction, however,
is untenable. Individuals always interfere with the autonomy
of each other; that is what living in a society is all about. Ap-
plying the suggested criterion to something as common as a
speed limit would be problematic. Would government enforce-
ment be justified because speeders have interfered with the au-
tonomy of other highway users, or would the law be invalid
because the speed limit lobby had impermissibly interfered
with the autonomy of speeders? Enforcement of heroin laws,
Sunday closing laws and virtually any other law of consequence
would pose a similar dilemma. Ultimately, deciding which
party had been the victim and which the offender would de-
pend on mere political preference. Thus, a criterion based on
interference with another's autonomy is not useful for delineat-
ing permissible instances of government intrusion.
Any effort to rehabilitate a theory of negative rights is
doomed to failure because no analytically acceptable distinction
between public and private spheres of interest exists. The zero-
sum, reciprocal relationship that exists between individual
spheres of private autonomy means that whenever the govern-
ment, in the exercise of its public function, protects or fails to
protect a private interest, it is also interfering with a private in-
terest in violation of the central tenet of negative rights theory.
More fundamentally, however, the very concept of a private
20. See supra text accompanying note 14. At worst, interpretation of the
principle would reflect only the preference of the individual interpreter,
thereby undermining the concept of individual liberty by permitting one indi-
vidual to define the scope of another's autonomy. See supra text accompany-
ing note 15.
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sphere of individual autonomy poses an analytical dilemma be-
cause the private sphere simply has no meaning independent of
that given it by the public sphere. Accordingly, it makes no
more sense to view a private sphere of autonomy as private
than it does to view a principle as nonpolitical or an individual
right as antimajoritarian.
3. Communitarian Rights Theory
Theories of communitarian or collective rights are not the-
ories of individual rights at all. In fact, they are the opposite of
theories of individual rights. Unlike liberal theories of rights,
which treat protection of individual liberty as the ultimate ob-
jective,2 1 communitarian theories subordinate individual liberty
to collective well-being. Even though the pursuit of collective
interests arguably can advance individual interests, the interest
of the individual never prevails over the interest of the group.
The group replaces the individual as the fundamental social
unit.22
Abandoning the focus on individual liberty, communitarian
theories initially may appear to have the capacity to overcome
the analytical dilemmas plaguing liberal rights theories. After
all, the antimajoritarian dilemma results because society could
never recognize an individual right against the will of the ma-
jority.23 Further, the principle/politics dilemma frustrates even
a good faith effort by the majority to force itself to respect an
individual right, because any constraint that the majority
chooses to impose on itself depends upon acts interpretation,
which in turn depends on the will of the majority or of the in-
21. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
22. Marxism is perhaps the most common communitarian theory of this
type. Although contemporary versions of neo-Marxism can vary considerably,
the desire to break down, or at least to de-emphasize, the allure of traditional
liberalism remains a common thread. For an example of challenges to liberal
premises, see Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations, in THE POLITIcS OF
LAW 65-88 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). For examples developed specifically in the
context of communitarian rights, see Tushnet, supra note 10, at 1375-84 and M.
Tushnet, Rights and Group Rights in Pluralist Society 15-23 (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Minnesota Law Review). Communitarian rights
theory, as used in the present context, should not be confused with theories of
group rights sometimes advanced in connection with discrete and insular mi-
norities. See, e.g., Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. PHIL. &
PuB. AFF. 107, 147-77 (1976) (arguing that race discrimination, and conse-
quently the legal remedies for race discrimination, should be viewed as group
phenomena).
23. See supra text accompanying notes 4-10.
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dividual decision maker.24 And even if the majority were to
overcome this obstacle, the public/private dilemma indicates
that the very act of protecting one individual right would neces-
sarily implicate the majority in the denial of some other indi-
vidual right.25 Arguably, then, it makes little sense to claim
that we are talking about individual rights at all when we talk
about the protection of individual interests. We may be talking
about nothing more than the preferences of society, and any ef-
fect on individual interests may be largely incidental. If so, this
would seem to justify a shift in emphasis from individual to
communitarian theories of rights.
Rights, however, are actually no more communitarian than
they are individual in nature. Although the ultimate objective
of a communitarian rights theory might be different from that
of an individual rights theory, the problems encountered in
seeking to implement that objective would be very much the
same. Some determination must be made concerning what res-
olution of a given issue best advances the collective good.
Whether that determination was made anew in each individual
case 26 or was made in accordance with general principles
thought to advance the collective good in the range of cases, 27
implementation of a communitarian rights strategy would de-
pend on acts of interpretation performed by individual decision
makers. As a result, some version of each dilemma that arose
in the context of individual rights would reappear in the con-
text of communitarian rights.
The public/private dilemma would reappear because of the
continuing need to distinguish and strike the proper balance be-
tween individual and collective interests. Although the stated
objective of communitarian rights theory is to advance the col-
lective good, theorists would have to conclude that some con-
cessions to individual autonomy were necessary to best promote
the collective good, just as individual rights theorists believe
that some concessions to the collective good will best promote
individual liberty.28 A means of defining the sphere of superior
24. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
25. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
26. Compare the concepts of act and rule utilitarianism, which are dis-
cussed in W. FRANKENA, ETHICS 34-43 (1973).
27. See id. See generally N. REsCHER, DIsTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 139-40 (1966)
(bibliography of act and rule utilitarian sources).
28. One might argue that exclusive adherence to communitarian objec-
tives, without regard to individual interests, would avoid the troublesome bal-
ancing inherent in the efforts of liberal theory to accommodate competing
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collective interests that is free from domination by individual
interests, however, is nonexistent. Just as the sphere of
individual autonomy encompassing an individual right is sus-
pect because it cannot exist in any way that the majority itself
does not define, the sphere of collective interests comprising a
communitarian right cannot be defined in any way that an indi-
vidual decision maker does not ultimately determine. Accord-
ingly, unless there is some way to ensure that individual
interests do not impermissibly influence the scope of the public
sphere, the public/private dilemma will persist even under a
theory of communitarian rights.
The most promising way to ensure that communitarian
rights are not subservient to the individual interests of the deci-
sion maker is to insist that the decision maker behave in ac-
cordance with the fundamental principles incident to a theory
of communitarian rights. By rooting the interpretation of as-
serted rights in principle, rather than permitting it to flow from
the preferences of the decision maker or an interest group with
whom the decision maker is in sympathy, definition of the pub-
lic sphere might be kept truly public. That, however, would
serve only to reintroduce the principle/politics dilemma. Be-
cause it is meaningless to speak in terms of the actual content
of a principle as opposed to its interpretation, 29 some method
would have to be found for selecting among competing inter-
pretations of the principle at issue. As was true with respect to
individual rights, all available options are political rather than
principled in nature. Even an interpretation that could be said
to flow from the political preferences of the majority would not
merit characterization as a principled interpretation. It would
simply confuse principles with plebiscites.30 Accordingly, there
would be no nonpolitical way of determining the scope of a
communitarian right, just as there is no nonpolitical way of de-
termining the scope of an individual right.
individual and collective interests. That cannot be the case, however. Commu-
nitarian theorists have to balance precisely the same competing interests
whenever they decide how much food, medical care, privacy, or freedom of ex-
pression they wish to make available to individuals in order to maximize the
value of those individuals to the community. The fact that the ultimate objec-
tive of the balancing process is different does not eliminate the need to strike
the balance.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
30. Note that the meaning of a right in principle can differ from the views
of a majority concerning the meaning of that right, even if the right is commu-
nitarian in nature. The majority may simply be wrong about what best ad-
vances the collective good.
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Most significantly, a variant of the antimajoritarian di-
lemma would also reappear under a theory of communitarian
rights. Just as no individual right can secure recognition unless
the majority is willing to honor it, no communitarian right
could secure recognition unless an individual were willing to
honor it. Because a community can act only through individual
agents, the fate of a communitarian right would depend com-
pletely on the decision of the agent delegated the power to con-
trol its recognition. Also, even though a particular agent could
be removed for wrongfully failing to honor an asserted commu-
nitarian right, both the removal decision and any subsequent
decision concerning recognition of the asserted right would
have to be made by individual agents. Individuals, even those
acting as agents of a community, can only be expected to act in
ways that advance their own individual interests. Even individ-
uals who claim to be acting in the interest of others are essen-
tially maximizing self-interest within the structure of whatever
incentive system exists. Although incentives can influence the
manner in which self-interested decisions will be made, the dis-
positive factor concerning recognition of a communitarian right
will ultimately be the individual interests of the decision
maker.31 In the final analysis, therefore, a communitarian right
could never exist unless recognition of the right were in the in-
terest of the individual charged with making the recognition
decision. Accordingly, it is inaccurate to assert that a right is
communitarian.
Because communities are able to act only through individ-
ual representatives, the inescapable problem with a theory of
communitarian rights is that any effort to formulate, imple-
ment, ascertain, or even report a collective action is itself an in-
dividual action, dictated by individual interests rather than by
any actual measure of the collective good. As the problem with
liberal theory demonstrates, however, the nature of individual-
ity is equally perverse. Individuals do not exist in isolation.
Rather, they exist in societies that have power superior to their
31. Of course, arguments can be made that individuals are capable of act-
ing in other than self-interested ways, but such arguments are as problematic
in the context of communitarian rights as analogous arguments concerning the
will of the majority are in the context of individual rights. See supra text ac-
companying notes 4-10. Again, although there are a variety of ways in which
individual interest could be measured, a positivist measure would appear to be
the most reliable. Such a measure would eliminate the need to consider what
the individual said, or even perceived, was in her best interest by defining the
decision maker's individual interest to coincide with the way in which the deci-
sion maker resolved the claim of right. See supra note 4.
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own. As a result, individuals have only that degree of individu-
ality that is recognized and permitted by the society. As an an-
alytical matter, liberal theories of individual rights and
communitarian theories of collective rights suffer the same
flaw. Both depend on a meaningful distinction between the in-
dividual and society which does not exist. Individuals have only
that autonomy that the society chooses to give them and the so-
ciety has only that will accorded by its individual agents. Any
theory of rights, therefore, that rests on a distinction between
the individual and society-a distinction on which all theories
of rights necessarily must rest-is destined to lack analytical
coherence.
C. EXTRAPOLATION
The analytical dilemmas generated by efforts to evaluate
each of the foregoing theories of rights do not reflect defects in-
herent in the theories themselves. Rather, the dilemmas are
artifacts of the mode of analysis used to evaluate those theories.
The mode of analysis used was customary rational analysis,
characterized by the application of logical rules to valid initial
premises-the same analytical method that we purport to use
whenever we perform rational analysis. If the foregoing analy-
ses had their intended effect, they should have been at least
mildly unsettling. You should have been left with the feeling
that I did something wrong, although you should be uncertain
about precisely what my error was. The analyses are unsettling
because the results they produce are counterintuitive. As for
what I did wrong, however . .. well, I did absolutely nothing
that the rules of the governing paradigm do not permit.
The most that can be said to refute the foregoing manipula-
tions is that one does not have to set up the analyses as I have
done; alternative definitions and perspectives could have been
used which would have led to more satisfying results. But the
point is that there is nothing analytically improper about set-
ting things up as I did. The nature of language and logic is such
that it is always possible to generate counterintuitive conclu-
sions without violating any of the rules of rational analysis. By
manipulating linguistic definitions and controlling the ways in
which logical premises interact, it is possible to predetermine
and consciously shape any conclusion that is produced. The
only thing wrong with what I have done is that it leads to con-
clusions that are intuitively unacceptable. Our intuitions, how-
ever, cannot properly be relied on to help distinguish between
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the manipulated conclusions and the arguably genuine ones, be-
cause the very reason that we have chosen the logical method
for our rational analyses is that we do not trust our intuitions
to lead us to valid conclusions. But as the foregoing manipula-
tions suggest, the conclusions reached in accordance with the
rules of a paradigm dominated by language and logic are not
likely to be any more trustworthy.
II. LANGUAGE AND LOGIC
Rational discourse occurs in an analytical paradigm domi-
nated by language and logic. For whatever reason, the legacy
left us by ancient Greece and the Enlightenment was a fond-
ness for rational thought and a distinct distrust of nonrational
modes of analysis.32 As a result, neither ineffable assertions
nor illogical conclusions properly can be relied on to provide ra-
tional accounts of social phenomena. The problem with such a
paradigm is that language and logic lack the capacity to account
for the phenomena that they must explain. Language lacks the
ability to encompass concepts that cannot be reduced to words,
and logic refuses to recognize the full range of interactions that
can occur among conceptual premises. It is not surprising,
therefore, that a rational paradigm in which language and logic
mark the limits of permissibility has failed to yield a coherent
theory of rights. If better accounts of social phenomena are to
be found, finding them will require a paradigm shift.
A. LANGUAGE
Current rational analysis consists of two stages. At the
first stage, the social phenomena of concern are reduced to
linguistic representations. At the second stage, those linguistic
representations are incorporated into premises, which are then
subjected to logical operations in the hope of generating
reliable conclusions.3 3 The logical evaluation that occurs at the
second stage of the analytical process poses serious problems.34
Even before reaching the second stage, however, the superfi-
32. It has been suggested that the ancient Greeks were not as smitten by
rationality as is customarily assumed. See E. DODDS, THE GREEKS AND THE IR-
RATIONAL (1951).
33. For a similar characterization of the legal analytical process, albeit a
characterization offered to support a somewhat different point, compare Kel-
man, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 591-92 (1981).
34. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
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cially innocuous act of describing the pertinent social phenom-
ena, which occurs at the first stage, is problematic. The
difficulty stems from the nature and analytical use of
language.35
Language has three limitations that make it susceptible to
manipulation in a way that can undermine rational rigor. First,
language is contingent and context-dependent rather than
rooted in an objective reality which would give it the stability
to withstand efforts at manipulation. Second, the rational para-
digm places language under considerable pressure to be binary,
which ironically causes linguistic formulations to be less rather
than more reliable. Finally, language is incapable of directly
capturing concepts that cannot be expressed in words, thereby
permitting variations in linguistic approximations of those con-
cepts to be interchanged without notice during the course of a
particular analytical exercise.
Wittgenstein has established that language can be more
satisfactorily conceived of as the context-dependent creation
of a particular community than as a set of symbols that corre-
spond to an objective reality.36 For present purposes, this
35. There is a voluminous literature concerning the philosophy of lan-
guage, on which the present discussion relies as indicated but in no way at-
tempts to exhaust or summarize.
36. The hornbook reading of Wittgenstein is that after making unsatisfac-
tory efforts in TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOsoPHicUS (1922) to account for the
phenomenon of language by tying literal meaning to propositions that were ac-
curate in a factual or scientific sense, Wittgenstein changed gears and at-
tempted, in PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1935), to account for language as
an open-ended outgrowth of community conventions about meaning. This is
almost certainly an oversimplification. The fundamental problem with which
Wittgenstein was concerned is related to whether language is completely at-
tached to a pre-existing reality, not at all attached to such a reality, or some-
thing in-between. The problem is of course a difficult one, and Wittgenstein's
views have themselves become the object of scholarly interpretation. See, e.g.,
S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982); see also
Gellner, The Gospel According to Ludwig (Book Review), 53 AM. SCHOLAR 243
(1984) (reviewing S. KRIPKE, supra). An interesting view is that Wittgen-
stein's evolution from the Tractatus to Philosophical Investigations did not so
much evidence a change in the nature of his views about language as it did a
change in the nature of his views about how one should philosophize about
language. See Pears, The Mysteries of Meaning (Book Review), NEW REPUB-
LIC, May 19, 1986, at 37 (reviewing A. AYER, WITTGENSTEIN (1985) and J. FIND.
LAY, WITTGENSTEIN: A CRITIQUE (1984)). Pears suggests that Wittgenstein
ultimately transcended the question whether language was objective or subjec-
tive, id. at 39-41,-a suggestion that is consistent with the thesis of the present
essay. More recently, Richard Rorty has explicitly urged that analytic philoso-
phy transcend this and other similar questions. R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND
THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
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means that language consists of terminology with variable
rather than fixed content. The meaning of a term or linguistic
formulation in a particular context is in part a function of both
the speaker's intent and the listener's understanding.3 7 As a re-
sult, language can become ambiguous; the message transmitted
is not necessarily the same as the message received. Moreover,
the interaction between intent and understanding that occurs
as conversation progresses can give rise to additional possibili-
ties for meaning that neither of the participants intended. 38 By
adding a third listener or several listeners who then proceed to
discuss the conversation among themselves, the potential for
variations in meaning becomes vast. Indeed, the only reason
that we are able to communicate with each other at all is that
within a given community, homogeneity of perspective and ex-
perience limits the range of meanings likely to be given particu-
lar terms.39
Although the level of homogeneity in a given culture or
subculture may be sufficient to permit ordinary conversation, it
may not be sufficient to permit the degree of linguistic preci-
sion required to ensure rational rigor. Rational analysis, like
the scientific method that it emulates, requires a high degree of
precision in establishing the meaning of the terminology em-
ployed in a formal argument. In the context of legal, moral, or
philosophical problems, however, the community is unlikely to
display a high level of consensus concerning the meaning of the
terms that must be used to define those problems. Terms such
as "right" or "principle" or "antimajoritarian" are sufficiently
imprecise that their definitions are almost certain to constitute
the weak link in any rigorous analytical argument that employs
them.40 Moreover, the nature of the issues that are likely to be
37. Language is, however, not completely a function of subjective intents.
Indeed, the nature of the external constraining factors is the essence of the
problem with which Wittgenstein and others have been concerned. See supra
note 36.
38. If the first speaker sends message A, but the second speaker receives
message A' and responds by sending message B, which the first speaker re-
ceives as message B', the communication that actually occurs does not corre-
spond to the communication that either speaker intended or thought had
occurred.
39. Professor Tushnet has suggested a similar account of how legal deci-
sions are made and how they secure acceptance in the face of doctrinal rules
that are actually indeterminate. See M. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 1-9.
40. Cf. Lehman, Rules In Law, 72 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1579 (1984) (Law is an
open system where rules do not fully specify particular actions or judgments;
therefore, when law is treated as a closed, analytical system it will inevitably
produce some wrong results.).
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involved aggravates the problem. Social issues relating to abor-
tion, race relations, or other matters touching on arguably fun-
damental rights invariably require elusive distinctions to be
drawn and delicate balances to be struck. The imprecision in-
herent in the terminology that must be used to describe those
issues, however, tends to make only gross accommodation
among competing interests possible. The type of linguistic ter-
minology required for a rational analytical approach to social
problems is rooted in neither objective reality nor stable com-
munity consensus. Consequently, both intended and unin-
tended exploitation of the resulting imprecision can weaken an
analysis.
The second limitation on the capacity of language to facili-
tate rational analysis compounds the first. Although binary
logic is an important component of the rational paradigm, it is
useful only with respect to propositions that have either one
polar value or another.41 As a result, the desire to use logic cre-
ates an incentive to describe social phenomena in terms of lin-
guistic dichotomies. In a linguistic dichotomy, however, the
definition of an operative term can be made completely depen-
dent on the definition of its opposite member. Good can be de-
fined as the absence of evil; light can be defined as the absence
of dark; and so forth. The terms in the dichotomy, therefore,
become not only mutually supporting but self-referential as
well.4 2
When performing logical operations on self-referential as-
sertions, the inherent circularity of those assertions may often
generate an analytical dilemma. Perhaps the most famous ex-
ample is a variation of the Epimenides paradox, produced when
one attempts to assess the truth of the assertion that all gener-
alizations are false.43 A similar dilemma occurred in the evalu-
ation of the various formulations of rights theories considered
in Part I of this Essay, which showed that antimajoritarian was
the same as majoritarian, principle the same as politics, public
the same as private, and the individual the same as society.
Without violating the rules of logical analysis, the demonstra-
tion did make use of weaknesses inherent in the formulation of
linguistic dichotomies to produce analytical dilemmas. For ex-
41. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
42. If good is the absence of evil, and evil is the absence of good, good can
also be defined as the absence of the absence of good. Cf Kennedy, The Turn
To Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 274-75 (1985) (emphasizing the fluid-
ity, tensions, and manipulability of binary oppositions).
43. Bear in mind that the assertion is itself a generalization.
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ample, the assertion that a right must be antimajoritarian be-
comes paradoxical when defining a right as something that, to
have consequence, must be honored by the majority.4 Because
such weaknesses are inevitable, they will pose a potential prob-
lem whenever a dichotomy is used. Moreover, because we priv-
ilege binary, dichotomous language in conducting rational
analyses, the language that we use will always create the poten-
tial for undermining the soundness of an analysis.
The third limitation on the capacity of language is the most
obvious, but it is also the most significant. Language is incapa-
ble of directly expressing ineffable concepts. We can use lan-
guage to hint at or talk around such concepts but never to
capture them completely. Even the artistic uses of language
that characterize our rhetoric, literature and poetry attempt to
evoke, rather than directly express, concepts and ideas that
elude articulation. The way that expository language attempts
to deal with ineffable concepts is by describing or approximat-
ing them. Linguistic approximation, however, necessarily falls
short of accurate representation.
Most of the concepts that are of legal, moral, or philosophi-
cal interest are ineffable. 45 The concept of rights provides a
perfect example; it simply refuses to be confined by any linguis-
tic formulation. As a result, the slippage that exists between a
linguistic approximation and the actual concept that it purports
to represent can pose additional problems in attempting a ra-
tional analysis of a social issue.4 6 Because the linguistic formu-
lation oversimplifies and potentially distorts the underlying
concept, an otherwise valid analysis might be too artificial to be
of much use. Even assuming that the analysis can work per-
fectly well on the level at which the linguistic representation
occurs, it may simply fail to be relevant on the level at which
the concept itself exists.
In addition, slight variations in the linguistic formulation of
a concept might initially appear to be inconsequential because
44. See supra text accompanying note 6. The self-reference is accom-
plished by the subtle substitution of terms with slight variations in meaning,
as discussed at infra text accompanying note 47.
45. For a discussion of the psychology of decision making that relies on
ineffable understanding, see W. LEHMAN, How WE MAKE DECISIONS 69-95
(1986).
46. To simplify matters, I am assuming that there is such a thing as an
"actual concept" of rights. Realistically, impressions about the concept may
vary in the same way that the meaning of a linguistic term varies. The point
of the present argument, however, is that for any given "actual meaning" of
the concept, no linguistic formulation is capable of capturing that meaning.
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they do not alter the accuracy with which the formulation ap-
proximates the underlying concept. Interchanging one linguis-
tic approximation with another in the course of the same
analysis, however, can undermine rigor and distort results in a
way that might escape notice. Whether done intentionally or
through inattention, the effect can be to undermine the relia-
bility, as well as the intuitive acceptability, of an analysis. In-
deed, the conclusions generated in Part I may well seem
counterintuitive because of the slippage that exists between the
linguistic formulations used and the ineffable concepts that
they were offered to represent. For example, the self-referen-
tial antimajoritarian dilemma was created by substituting the
formulation of a consequential right for the formulation of an
antimajoritarian right midway through the analysis. Because
no linguistic formulation fully captures the ineffable concept of
rights, the slippage between each term and the underlying con-
cept permitted the substitution to go largely unnoticed or, if no-
ticed, to be largely unobjectionable.47 Not only does language
have limitations that can adversely affect efforts at rational
analysis, but the difficulties introduced through heavy reliance
on language are then exacerbated by analytical conventions
that place heavy reliance on logic as well.
B. LOGIC
The allure of logic appears to lie in its promise for promot-
ing harmony. The rules of logic provide that a conclusion is
true if it logically follows from true premises. Accordingly,
when the logical method establishes a conclusion as true in this
irrefutable way, it cannot be the subject of legitimate debate.
Because all rational people must accept the conclusion, the
method leads to social harmony. This vision of harmony almost
certainly accounts for our persistent reliance on logical analysis
as the proper approach to social problems. This vision, how-
ever, has a flaw which is fatal to its acceptability. Logical
analysis can ensure true conclusions only if it starts with true
premises. The premises that we use to describe our social
problems, however, are neither true nor false; they are indeter-
minate. Logic tells us nothing about how indeterminate prem-
ises should interact to generate reliable conclusions. In
addition, logical analysis has a tenacious capacity for self-pres-
ervation that tends to make it affirmatively





Logical rules are designed to govern the interaction be-
tween premises, but the logical method says nothing about the
validity of the premises themselves. To ensure that a logical
conclusion is true, therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the
initial premises are true.4 9 Although demonstrating the meta-
physical truth of a premise that describes a social phenomenon
would be difficult, agreement with the premise can serve as an
adequate substitute for truth.50 As long as the analysis com-
plies with the logical rules, any conclusion generated should be
acceptable at least to those who agree with the initial premises.
The nature of social phenomena is such, however, that it rarely
makes sense to speak of truth and falsity, or even acceptability,
of the premises used to reflect social principles. Too many
qualifications and contextual factors affect the validity of a par-
ticular description of a social phenomenon to ascribe to it the
required binary truth value. At most, the truth value of such a
premise is indeterminate, but such a classification disqualifies
the premise for any use that is consistent with logical rigor.
Realizing the importance of acceptable initial premises, so-
48. The present discussion concerns binary logic of the type commonly
used in legal and philosophical discourse. Once again, there is a voluminous
literature on logic, which the present discussion does not attempt to exhaust
or summarize. It should be noted that there do exist nonbinary, multivalued
logical systems capable of governing the interaction between premises whose
truth values are unknown or are understood in terms of probabilities. Those
logical systems, however, are unlikely to be of more use than binary logic in
helping to resolve the types of social problems that are currently under consid-
eration. In addition, there are more esoteric systems, with names like episte-
mic logic, quantum logic, fuzzy logic, and complimentarity, which are highly
technical and beyond the scope of the present discussion.
49. Cf. R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 13-18 (1981) (suggesting
a distinction between deductive proof, for which truth of premises is required,
and philosophical explanation, for which such truth is not necessarily re-
quired).
Truth and falsity is not the only dichotomy that can be used in a logical
analysis. Any dichotomy will suffice as long as it is exhaustive. Accordingly,
dichotomies such as public/private or principle/politics can properly be used in
a logical analysis as long as the relationship between the two members is rec-
ognized to be binary. It is always possible to restate such a dichotomy in terms
of truth or falsity by focusing on only one member. For example, with respect
to the public/private dichotomy, it is either true or false that something is pub-
lic. Moreover, because the dichotomy is exhaustive, falsity with respect to one
member constitutes truth with respect to the other.
50. See id. at 14.
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cial theorists, including those who concern themselves with
rights, select initial premises that appear to be true. Fre-
quently, theorists select a premise that is linguistically too im-
precise to generate much opposition, such as the premise that
all people are entitled to the equal protection of the laws. Al-
ternatively, it is possible to prescribe a procedure for the pro-
duction of conclusions that will maximize their acceptability,
such as Rawls's famed original-position procedure for deriving
principles of justice.51 Neither the imprecise nor the proce-
dural premise, however, can be useful in a logical analysis be-
cause neither possesses a truth value that is susceptible to
binary reduction.
A linguistically imprecise premise is indeterminate rather
than true or false. The very imprecision that maximizes accept-
ability also deprives the premise of the capacity to yield particu-
lar results to the exclusion of other results. If the premise
were precise enough to yield only one result, it would be too
precise to secure general acceptability.52 Whether the equal
protection principle, for example, requires the assessment of an
income tax against everyone in a fixed amount, at a fixed per-
centage, or in progressive percentages depends on what one
means by "equal." If one decides that "equal" means identical
numerical value, the equal protection premise arguably ac-
quires a determinate meaning, but it will not be a generally ac-
cepted one. Many people will find the premise to be false in
the income tax context, thereby making it unsuitable for incor-
poration into a logical analysis. Those people will reject any
conclusion generated from the premise, and the desired social
harmony will not ensue.
In the context of most social problems, the act of ascribing
a truth value to a premise-deciding whether or not the prem-
ise is acceptable-replaces rather than facilitates logical analy-
sis. Before accepting or rejecting a premise one would first
want to know the purpose for which the premise was being of-
fered. Although numerical equivalence might be a perfectly ac-
ceptable construction of the term "equal" in a mathematical
context, that does not establish its acceptability in an income
tax context. It would, therefore, be unwise to agree to an im-
51. J. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 118-92.
52. This observation has been made by others. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note
15, at 63-65 (quoting R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 78 (1975) and Jaffe,
Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 986, 994 (1967)).
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precise proposition before knowing how it was to be used.
Peeking ahead to see how a premise will be used before taking
a position on its acceptability, however, overrides the logical
analysis. Conditioning the acceptability of the premise on the
conclusion to which it is linked defeats the whole purpose of
conducting a logical analysis. The conclusion has generated the
premise rather than having followed from it. Stated differ-
ently, the very meaning of the premise has been intrinsically
tied to the conclusion that it will be said to have generated.
The system has been closed before the analysis even begins,
thereby ensuring the desired result.5 3
Procedural premises are equally troublesome. Unlike a
linguistically ambiguous premise, for which people supply
meaning in a given context as a direct function of the purpose
for which it is used, a procedural premise arguably has a mean-
ing of its own that can exist independent of the conclusions to
which it gives rise. Rawls advocated a procedure for establish-
ing principles of justice through a hypothetical process of social
contract negotiations. Rawls's negotiators would be individuals
who, in the "original position," have equal rights in the choice
of principles and wear a veil of ignorance that keeps them una-
ware of their own characteristics so they cannot merely ad-
vance their own interests.54 The procedure is designed to serve
as a premise that has enough appeal to be generally acceptable
even in the absence of knowledge about what particular princi-
ples or conclusions it will generate. Such appeal is unwar-
ranted, however. To the extent that the procedural premise
seems acceptable, it is only because it too is sufficiently impre-
cise to permit all adherents to suppose that it will generate the
principles that they like. If, for example, the premise were said
to generate the conclusion that racial minorities should be ex-
terminated to prevent mongrelization of the dominant race, it
53. The "peeking ahead" phenomenon is illustrated by the suggestion that
a second-order-preference definition of rights could have been used to avoid
the antimajoritarian dilemma. See supra note 11. One would not normally ob-
ject to characterization of a right as antimajoritarian until, after peeking
ahead, one saw the trouble that it would entail. Presumably, one would also
be reluctant to agree to a second-order-preference characterization without
first knowing how that characterization was ultimately to be used. Cf Kel-
man, supra note 33, at 591-92 (suggesting that "interpretive construction" un-
dermines "rational rhetoricism"). For a forceful assertion that all of our
observations-even those of the hard sciences-are necessarily governed by
the theoretical framework in which those observations are to be employed, see
P. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 31 (1975).
54. J. RAWLs, supra note 2, at 118-92.
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is unlikely that members of racial minorities would approve.
The racial minority members would argue that the procedure
they had in mind when they accepted the procedural premise
does not generate such a principle, just as proponents of a pro-
gressive income tax would argue that the equal protection prin-
ciple they had in mind does not require numerical equivalence
in the income tax context.55 In fact, Rawls-who creates the
impression of logical rigor through frequent use of terms like
"rational," "proof," "theorem," "premise," and "conclusion" 56
-
encourages just this type of result-oriented, intuitive evaluation
of principles to produce a desirable state of "reflective equilib-
rium. ' 57 The acceptability of a procedural premise, like that of
the indeterminate premise, will have to be determined by a
peek at the conclusion to which it is to be linked which, once
again, overrides the logical analysis.58
55. More realistically, Rawls asserted that his procedural premise would
result in the adoption of a maximin rule to govern the selection of particular
principles of justice-a rule borrowed from decision theory-that would direct
the social contract negotiators to select principles that would maximize the so-
cial condition of the minimally advantaged in society. J. RAwLs, supra note 2,
at 152-53. Professor Kaye, however, has demonstrated that the maximin rule
is too specific to be unobjectionable. Although it constitutes one rational strat-
egy for selecting principles of justice in the original position, Kaye argues that
there are several other decision-theory strategies that are just as rational
under the conditions of uncertainty existing in the original position. Kaye,
Playing Games With Justice: Rawls and the Maximin Rule, 6 Soc. THEORY &
PRAC. 33, 37 (1980).
56. Others have also made this observation. See R. WOLFF, UNDERSTAND-
ING RAWLS 3-5 (1977); Kaye, supra note 55, at 33.
57. Rawls himself recognizes the tension between deductive and intuitive
decision making that is present in his argument. He states that he is striving
for deductive truth but admits the significant influence of intuition. See J.
RAwLs, supra note 2, at 121. His concept of reflective equilibrium is offered to
mediate this tension through a dialectical process-Rawls calls it "Socratic,"
id at 49-by which principles are tested against intuitions and intuitions are
tested against principles, and each serves to refine the other. Id at 20, 48-51,
432, 579. A central purpose of the present essay is to argue that, to date, we
have not developed an epistemological model-a paradigrn-in which such a
form of argument is explicitly cognizable. It is, for example, easy to character-
ize Rawls's argument as entirely intuitive because it permits the rejection of a
principle whenever the principle generates an intuitively distasteful result.
Under this characterization, the concept of reflective equilibrium becomes
nothing more than a sophisticated description of the process through which in-
tuitions might work. If one is committed to the "principle" of the indetermi-
nacy of principle, the urge to characterize Rawls's argument as entirely
intuitive becomes irresistible.
58. Even when the truth value of premises can be established satisfacto-
rily, logical systems still possess a curious characteristic that might well make
one reluctant to submit to logic completely. Gddel has demonstrated that




Not only is logic of little use in connection with premises
having an indeterminate truth value, but our heavy analytical
reliance on logic may be affirmatively counterproductive as
well. Because the difficulties inherent in assessing the sound-
ness of a logical conclusion are not generally recognized, we are
likely to accord excessive deference to logical analysis. We tend
to treat logical conclusions as if they were true in some neutral
and detached sense rather than regarding them as contingent
adjuncts to particular preferences that we happen to have
under particular circumstances. When we fine people, put
them in jail, or order them to pay damages for breach of con-
tract or negligent driving, we do not tell them that we merely
prefer for them to endure such fates. Rather, we tell them that
general principles to which they themselves subscribe have
sealed their fates because the particular consequences they
must suffer follow logically from those principles. It is un-
likely, however, that we could either give or receive such expla-
nations if we better appreciated how tenuous they were.
Accordingly, our deference to logic can be counterproductive to
the extent that it perpetuates a distorted account of why we do
the things that we do to each other.5 9
and sophistication, there exist formally undecidable statements-propositions
whose truth or falsity can never be proven. See M. KLINE, MATHEMATICS: THE
LOSS OF CERTAINTY 260-64 (1980); E. NAGEL & J. NEWMAN, GMDEL'S PROOF 6,
98 (1958). Loosely analogized to the legal system, Gidel's theorem might mean
something like the proposition that the legal status of certain claims could
never be known. It might be possible, for example, to determine that the first
amendment protected political speech and that it did not protect obscenity, but
impossible to ever determine whether the first amendment protected commer-
cial speech. The differences between formal logical systems and our less rigor-
ous legal system are substantial enough that it is probably not useful to
attempt a direct application of G(del's theorem to legal or philosophical analy-
ses. Metaphorically, however, G6del's theorem does suggest a cause for uneas-
iness. The existence of undecidable statements within a logical system means
that the system is incomplete. The whole point of selecting logic as the core of
our notion of rationality, however, is that logic constitutes a closed system in
which things happen in a predictable way, in accordance with orderly rules
that are understandable and reliable. One of the implications of G6del's theo-
rem is that logic is not such a system. To account for everything that goes
on-to determine the truth value of certain statements or to explain why they
are undecidable-one would have to go outside of the system. The intrigue
that Gidel's theorem holds for me lies in its implication that there has to be
some more comprehensive way of understanding the phenomena with which
we are confronted than the way that logic permits us to understand them.
59. Arguably, logic is useful as a tool for social control, irrespective of its
coherence, because it causes individuals to submit to actions that they would
resist if those actions were perceived to result merely from the particular pref-
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Furthermore, reliance on the logical method may motivate
us to engage in modes of thought that are inappropriate to the
circumstances. Because we realize that logical analysis requires
the use of binary premises, we tend to think in dichotomous
terms, even in circumstances in which such thought is likely to
be inappropriate. Most social phenomena are too complicated
for binary reduction. Whether something is public or private,
for example, depends on so many factors and perspectives that
describing a social phenomenon in terms of the public/private
dichotomy can become more than a descriptive act. The selec-
tive inclusion and exclusion of characteristics necessary to ac-
complish the binary reduction may actually alter the perceived
nature of the phenomenon described. The end result of re-
peated exercises in binary reduction can be to convey an over-
simplified version of the social world in which we live. 60
Finally, our attachment to logic is counterproductive be-
cause it dilutes the incentive to formulate new modes of con-
ceptualization that could help us transcend the flaws of logical
analysis. Because what we think is largely a function of how
we think, our attachment to logical analysis tends to perpetuate
itself. To make logic useful, we conceive of the world in binary
terms, and by restricting ourselves to a binary mode of thought,
we continue to perceive logic as useful. Imposing such a restric-
tion on our mode of thought poses the risk of making us com-
placent. To the extent that we succumb to the temptation to
translate our world into the two dimensions required for logical
analysis, we will have failed to imagine new, more satisfying
forms of conceptualization that might permit us to overcome
the limitations of logical thought.
erence of a social decision maker. But legitimation of this type is rarely of-
fered as a justification for logical rigor, and such use of logic may not be
socially desirable.
60. For example, when the Supreme Court, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), held unconstitutional the controversial legislative veto device through
which Congress sought to retain control over administrative agencies, the ma-
jority's reasoning was so "binary" that one might well have been led to wonder
how the case had managed to generate so much scholarly debate. The Court
held that the veto device had to be either a law or not a law; and because it
was a law, it was unconstitutional because it did not follow the constitutionally
prescribed procedures for enactment of laws. Id at 956-59. The binary charac-
terization of the legislative veto masks serious conceptual difficulties, includ-
ing difficulties that are arguably paradoxical. See Spann, Deconstructing the
Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REv. 473, 493-99, 516-27, 536-44 (1984) (analyzing
the Chadha decision and the legislative veto); Spann, Spinning the Legislative




Full appreciation of social phenomena may require that we
abandon our present rationality, characterized by language and
logic, in favor of a new mode of thought. Thomas Kuhn de-
scribed what has now become the classic concept of a paradigm
shift.61 A paradigm shift occurs when a scientific community
decides that perceived phenomena can be better understood by
changing the conventions governing the ways in which they are
understood. By imposing a new model or organizing system-
by changing the rules of the analytical game-a paradigm shift
permits qualitatively distinct and more satisfying appreciation
of the phenomena. 62 Richard Rorty has extended the concept
of a paradigm shift from the scientific context in which Kuhn
discussed it to the realm of philosophical discourse, in which a
revolution in governing conventions can be as dramatic as it is
in a scientific context.63 Growing recognition of the limitations
of language and logic suggests that the conditions needed to
prompt a paradigm shift in rational discourse currently exist.64
People tend to believe that the analytical paradigm gov-
erning rational discourse is immune from the type of whole-
scale modification that characterizes a paradigm shift because
they believe that rationality corresponds to reality in a way
that makes rational analysis more than just another way of
looking at things. That belief, however, is erroneous. Our
logic-based system of rationality is neither natural nor com-
pelled by any need to correspond to objective reality. It is sim-
ply a human invention. Like mathematics, economics, or
Freudian psychology, rational accounts of phenomena consti-
tute nothing more than an organizational overlay that we im-
pose on our perceptions. True, absent close scrutiny, rational
explanations seem to account accurately for much of what we
61. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. en-
larged 1970).
62. Id. at 52-53.
63. See R. RORTY, supra note 36, at 322-56.
64. In addition to Rorty's dissatisfaction with the conventions of tradi-
tional analytic philosophy, see id., the Critical Legal Studies movement has
come to symbolize dissatisfaction with the conventions of traditional legal
analysis. For a comprehensive characterization of this movement, see Boyle,
The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 685 (1985). For examples of Critical Legal scholarship, see THE
POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). A Critical Legal Studies bibliography is printed in
Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461
(1984).
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perceive, but that was preordained. Our perceptions and our
systems for organizing them interact in much the same way
that logical conclusions and premises interact. After peeking
ahead, we ensure that the organizing system will be largely sat-
isfactory by closing the system. Everything that happens will
happen in accordance with the rules of the system because we
refuse to recognize as valid any perceptions that do not comply
with the rules. If we had another organizing system, it would
work just as well as our rational organizing system does-it
would have to. We would tailor our perceptions to work within
that substitute system just as we now tailor our perceptions to
operate within our rational paradigm.
65
Alternatives to the paradigm that presently governs our ra-
tional discourse do exist. Various eastern philosophical and
religious organizing systems, such as Zen Buddhism, are dis-
tinctly nonlogical in nature.66 Indeed, such systems appear to
deny the possibility of attaining ultimate understanding
through rational inquiry. Instead, they stress contemplation of
what we would consider logical paradoxes for the purpose of
transcending the rational modes of conceptualization that make
them paradoxical. 67 In our own culture, we rely heavily on
nonlogical organizing systems in a variety of contexts. Quan-
tum theory in modern physics is replete with observed phe-
nomena that are logical impossibilities.68 The Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, for example, demonstrates that sub-
atomic particles are often in two places at once-or no place at
all-even though such an occurrence cannot be accounted for
through the application of logical rules to the prequantum axi-
oms of physics.69 Perhaps the most prevalent form of nonratio-
nal conceptualization in our culture exists in the humanities.
Through art, music, and literature we conceptualize and com-
65. For recognition and discussion of the difficulties entailed in arguing
that one should yield or compromise a core belief, such as belief in the inher-
ent objective nature of things, see W. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
42-46 (1980).
66. See generally A. WATTS, THE WAY OF ZEN (1957) (a basic explanation
of Zen philosophy).
67. See id.
68. See H. PAGELS, THE COSMIC CODE (1982) (containing a comprehensible
discussion of quantum physics). See also H. PUTNAM, REALISM AND REASON
46-53 (1983) (describing the uncertain position of a molecular particle in quan-
tum mechanics).
69. See H. PAGELS, supra note 68, at 87-91; cf. Lehman, supra note 40, at




municate in ways that have nothing whatsoever to do with logic
or rationality, and the absence of rational rigor is vital to their
effectiveness. Indeed, it would never even occur to us to place
heavy reliance on rationality in such contexts.
We have had all the perceptions necessary to prompt a par-
adigm shift in rational analysis. Indeed, the increasing number
of books and essays like this one suggests that the shift may
have begun already.70 At least one writer has argued that a
paradigm shift cannot occur until a new paradigm has been en-
visioned to replace the old one.71 Whether or not that is true,
we already know enough about the essence of the new para-
digm to begin imagining its contours. The new paradigm will
be characterized primarily by features that compensate for the
defects existing in the present paradigm.
III. THE NEW PARADIGM
A new paradigm, providing an alternative way of viewing
old data, emerges when an existing paradigm ceases to permit
satisfactory analysis. Poststructuralist, modernist schools of
thought that have influenced theology and the humanities re-
cently have begun to influence law and moral philosophy as
well. 72 By questioning the distinction between reality and per-
ceptions about reality, these schools of thought have increased
the range of social phenomena that we are potentially able to
envision. Because of limitations imposed by language and logic,
however, the paradigm that currently governs our rational dis-
course has ceased to serve as a satisfactory medium for concep-
tualizing social phenomena; its descriptive and explanatory
powers have not kept pace with the complexity of our percep-
70. Several recent works proceed from the assumption of acute indetermi-
nacy in fashioning new approaches to our legal and philosophical problems.
See, e.g., L. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ART OF POLITICS (1985); W. LEHMAN, supra note 45;
R. RORTY, supra note 36; Boyle, supra note 64; Frug, The Ideology of Bureau-
cracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Heller, supra note 2;
Kennedy, supra note 42; Lehman, supra note 40; Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); M. Tushnet, supra
note 22; Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movemen 96 HARv. L. REv. 561
(1983); cf. R. PiRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1974)
("'What's emerging from the pattern of my own life is the belief that the cri-
sis is being caused by the inadequacy of existing forms of thought to cope with
the situation.'" Id. at 169.).
71. Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1217
(1985).
72. See sources cited infra note 75.
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tions. A new paradigm, reflecting a more modern appreciation
of rational thought, however, should help to overcome those
limitations. Language can be reconceived so that it has the ca-
pacity to capture ineffable concepts. And binary logic can be
de-emphasized so that our conception of rationality will toler-
ate a fuller range of interactions between ideas, including inter-
actions that we presently consider to be logical impossibilities.
Within such a reconceived analytical paradigm, it may be possi-
ble to formulate a coherent concept of rights. Ironically, how-
ever, because explaining the concept precisely may never be
possible, the rights may always remain secret-comprehensible
but not reducible to linguistic formulations.
A. MODERNISM
Modernism is a term that often refers to the belief that
fundamental, structural assumptions are proper subjects for
scrutiny and re-examination. In the context of Christian theol-
ogy, modernism refers to a movement in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries that advocated re-examination
of traditional religious doctrine in light of contemporary devel-
opments in science, history and philosophy. It connotes skepti-
cism about religious authority, biblical doctrine and the
historical accuracy of theological events.73 In the humanities,
modernism refers to a post-World War I movement, character-
ized by such works as nonrepresentational painting, atonal mu-
sic and stream-of-consciousness literature, in which the
conventions of traditional art forms ceased to be viewed as valid
limitations on artistic expression.74 Recently, theorists have
suggested that modernist tenets also have begun to influence
legal and moral philosophy.7 5 Because modernism offers the
promise of a qualitative advancement in analytical thought,
73. See generally A. VIDLER, THE MODERNIST MOVEMENT IN THE ROMAN
CHURCH: ITS ORIGINS AND OUTCOME (1934) (description and origins of the
modernist movement).
74. See Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656, 1659-68 (1986)
(discussing content and form of modernist art).
75. See Boyle, supra note 64, at 730 n.141; Luban, supra note 74, at 1687-
93; Unger, supra note 70, at 587, 660-62. Similar influences are taking hold in
analytic philosophy, see R. RORTY, supra note 36, in the philosophy of science,
see P. FEYERABEND, supra note 53, and in social sciences such as social psychol-
ogy, see Bruner & Feldman, Under Construction (Book Review), N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1986, at 46-49 (review of N. GOODMAN, OF MIND AND OTHER
MATTERS (1984)), and psychoanalysis, see D. SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH AND




modernist concerns can form the structure of a reconceived an-
alytical paradigm governing rational discourse.7 5A
Three tenets of modernist thought are relevant to the sorts
of analytical dilemmas that can stymie rational thought within
the confines of the present paradigm. The first is an insistent
skepticism about the distinction between object and subject.
The second, which builds on the first, is agnosticism concerning
the distinction between reality and perceptions. The third,
which builds on the second, is the liberation of imagination that
results from the heightened importance of the role that percep-
tions are permitted to play. The cumulative effect of these
three tenets may permit the formulation of more promising ap-
proaches to our analytical dilemmas.
A central tenet of modernist thought is its denial of a sharp
division between object and subject. Modern art, which is often
nonrepresentational, for example, not only invites but requires
active viewer participation in the artistic communication. As a
result, the "object" depicted in a painting is in part defined by
the characteristics attributed to it by the "subject" viewing the
painting, thereby undermining the distinction between the
two.7 6 In addition, critics have characterized the messages con-
veyed by modern art and by modern movements in other hu-
manistic disciplines as being preeminently about the disciplines
of which they are a part.77 If by painting in a way that violates
certain conventions, the artist is making artistic statements
about those conventions and about painting itself, the distinc-
tion between object and subject once again begins to dissipate.
The statements being made are about the statements being
made.
In law and legal philosophy, a similar breakdown in the
distinction between object and subject can be detected. For ex-
ample, one of the reasons that it is difficult to escape the an-
timajoritarian dilemma is that it is difficult to distinguish the
object of a theory of rights-the right itself-from the subject
75A. Much of modernism is firmly rooted in the early nineteenth century
work of Hegel, which both expresses skepticism concerning the distinction be-
tween subjective mind and objective reality and advocates a dialectical method
of logical thought permitting a synthesis between a thesis and its antithesis.
For an explication of Hegel's work, see P. SINGER, HEGEL (1983).
76. See D. Luban, supra note 74, at 4-8.
77. Id. at 6 (citing S. CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY 207, 219-20
(1968), M. FRIED, THREE AMERICAN PAINTERS: KENNETH NOLAND, JULES
OLITSKI, FRANK STELLA (1965), and Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in THE
NEW ART 67-68 (G. Battock rev. ed. 1973)).
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of the theory-the majority that must honor the right for it to
have consequential content.7 8 The content of the right is so in-
trinsically tied to the manner in which the majority will recog-
nize it that attempts to honor the distinction between the two
may well be artificial. More generally, the essence of much
modern critical thought is inescapably self-referential. Modern
skepticism about the ability to give principled accounts of per-
ceived phenomena necessarily must apply as well to the princi-
ples giving rise to that skepticism.7 9
The first tenet of modernism merges into the second. In
those instances in which no clear distinction exists between ob-
ject and subject, there also may be no clear distinction between
objective reality and subjective perceptions about reality. If ob-
jects are largely a function of the viewer's perceptions about
those objects, arguing about their true, objective nature may be
much like arguing about whether a particular work of modern
art is really a cloud or an amoeba. The question whether an ob-
jective reality exists at all is an interesting one, but it is one
about which modernism can afford to be agnostic. In any im-
portant context, the role of perceptions is likely to be signifi-
cant enough to be dispositive, whether or not one believes that
those perceptions ultimately rest on an objective foundation. In
the context of rights, perceptions would appear to be all that
matter. Even the staunchest natural rights advocate would
have to concede that the actual existence and content of a right
is functionally irrelevant because it is unknowable. Both theo-
retical and practical discussions of rights completely depend on
perceptions concerning those rights rather than on any actual
content of the rights.
The third tenet of modernism follows directly from the
second. By shifting the focus from objective reality to percep-
tions about reality, modernism increases the complexity of the
problems that may confront us. Picasso's conception of a gui-
tar, for example, is considerably more complex than a
premodern conception. Similarly, the antimajoritarian di-
lemma, with its persistent refusal to honor the object/subject
distinction, is more complex than the traditional conception of
an antimajoritarian right. Modernism also increases the range
of imaginable solutions to such problems. Active belief in an
78. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11; cf Frug, supra note 70, at
1286-92 (extrapolating object/subject problems to the distinction between law
and society).
79. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 64, at 713-15; Heller, supra note 2, at 163-72.
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objective reality imposes constraints on creativity by recogniz-
ing external limitations on what is possible. Agnosticism con-
cerning objective reality, however, accompanied by the view
that operative reality can be modified through the alteration of
perceptions about reality, serves to reduce constraint. It ac-
cords heightened importance to the role of perceptions which,
in turn, increases the incentive to imagine novel escapes from
seemingly insoluble dilemmas.
The essence of modernism lies in its willingness to question
the most fundamental structural assumptions of a discipline in
an effort to arrive at new levels of understanding. Modernism
also encourages experimentation with novel perspectives even
though they may generate theories with the capacity to under-
mine the very perspectives out of which they grow. The allure
of such experimentation lies in its promise for transcending our
current conventions about what constitutes impossibility. By
relying on modernist insights to reformulate the conventions
governing our analytical use of language and logic, we may be
able to shift to a more promising rational paradigm.
B. LANGUAGE IN THE NEW PARADIGM
A modernist approach to analytical language would tran-
scend traditional limitations on the form that language must
take to be useful in an analytical endeavor. The type of lan-
guage that we presently privilege when engaging in rational
discourse is expository language, which is narrowly tailored for
use in conjunction with logical analysis. Analytical language
can be reconceived, however, in a way that privileges its liter-
ary rather than its expository use. In rational analysis, as in
literature, language can be used to evoke reader responses di-
rectly rather than merely to describe objects and events. More-
over, once freed from its attachment to logical analysis,
language can utilize complex rather than binary imagery to
serve its function without undue artificiality or reductionism.
Because freedom from such constraint permits literary lan-
guage to be more expressive and articulate than expository lan-
guage, literary language has a greater capacity to capture and
convey ineffable concepts, despite their unwillingness to be re-
duced to words.80
80. A somewhat similar point has been made by Professor Weisberg, who
argues that lawyers, mired in their penchant for language, have lost-indeed
have come to symbolize loss of-the capacity for spontaneous human interac-
tion. The preference of lawyers is to talk about justice rather than to dispense
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Our present preference is to use expository language in
connection with our analytical activities-a preference with a
distinctly nonmodern flavor. Expository language presupposes
the ability to construct linguistic approximations of actual con-
cepts that are sufficiently precise to meet the demands of our
analytical machinery. As a result, the objective when using
language to engage in rational discourse is to define or approxi-
mate the pertinent concepts as precisely as possible. Indeed, we
sometimes carry our penchant for precise expository definition
to ridiculous extremes.8 1 The underlying assumption appears
to be that if we try hard enough, we can commit the essence of
it. Fittingly, Professor Weisberg makes his point by analyzing the role that
law and lawyers have played in major works of fiction. See R. WEISBERG, THE
FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FIcTION
(1984). Although I am not prepared to concede the existence of natural jus-
tice, or any other natural state of affairs that can be approached or approxi-
mated through literary language, I am willing to postulate the existence of
ideas, subject to varying degrees of societal sharing, that are qualitatively too
complex tp be expressed in expository terms without a significant loss in tex-
ture. It has been suggested that Weisberg's binary distinction between natural
action and artificial rhetoric is itself artificially reductionist, as evidenced by
the fact that the texts upon which Weisberg relies are themselves subject to
interpretations that contradict his own. See Heinzelman & Levinson, Words
and Wordiness: Reflections On Richard Weisberg's THE FAILURE OF THE
WORD, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 453 (1986). For Professor Weisberg's response, re-
asserting the preferability of certain textual interpretations over others, see
Weisberg, More Words On THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: A Response to Hein-
zelman and Levinson, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 473 (1986). In this regard, see also
Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons On Adjudication in Billy Budd,
Sailor, with an Application to Justice Rehnquis 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
Recognition of the advantages of viewing legal texts, such as statutes and
judicial opinions, as literary rather than expository works constitutes a major
strand of the law-and-literature movement, in both its moderate forms, see,
e.g., J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973), and extreme forms, see, e.g.,
Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60
TEX. L. REv. 551 (1982); see also West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The
Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Rich-
ard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985) (discussing Posner's mischaracteriza-
tion of human motivation, consent and wealth maximization); Posner, The
Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1431 (1986); West, Submission, Choice and Ethics, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449
(1986); see generally Symposium: Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373
(1982) (textuality and the lawyer's enterprise).
Difficulties can be encountered in attempting to define literature, as op-
posed to exposition, especially if one insists upon an expository definition. See
T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 1-16 (1983).
81. In American Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09
(1981), Justice Brennan pretended that a profoundly difficult social issue, the
proper manner of regulating exposure to toxic substances when the effects of
given exposure levels is uncertain, could be resolved by reliance on the dic-
tionary definition of a statutory term. In the context of this issue, the statu-
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a concept to paper by filtering out distracting nuances and con-
notations.8 2 As discussed in Part II above, however, the logic
on which we rely in conducting rational analysis often demands
a higher degree of precision in describing social concepts and
phenomena than is available through linguistic formulations.8 3
Moreover, the failure to attain the requisite degree of precision
can introduce distortions that undermine the soundness of an
analysis.8 4 To date, we have tended to view the literary use of
language as inappropriate in conducting rational discourse and
have affirmatively tried to avoid the types of studied ambiguity
that characterize literary language.85 Directly evoking the con-
cepts pertinent to rational discourse through literary tech-
niques, however, is perhaps better than depicting them
inaccurately through expository approximations.85
Direct evocation rather than description of concepts is, of
course, possible. That is what art is all about. And such artistic
use of language is the essence of literature. Because literary
devices can convey even elusive concepts with great precision,
an analysis incorporating literary uses of language avoids much
of the distortion introduced by an analysis incorporating exposi-
tory language. A short story or novel, for example, is almost
certain to better convey a concept such as love or hate or terror
than is the most sophisticated expository description. No mat-
ter how good an approximation the expository formulation is
able to offer, the literary work will necessarily be more satis-
factory because the literary work is able to evoke the actual
concept itself. Such direct evocation, in turn, minimizes distor-
tory term could not plausibly have had the meaning that the dictionary and
the Court attributed to it.
82. Carol Gilligan, together with a strand of the feminist movement in
law, has suggested that such a hard-nosed analytical approach is characteristi-
cally masculine. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 70 (1982); Menkel-
Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERK. WOm. L.J. 39 (1985). This maneuver raises intriguing ques-
tions about the sorts of strategies that are likely to best serve the long-term
interests of gender-based equality.
83. See supra text accompanying note 40.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
85. Perhaps the clearest illustration is the way that lawyers and philoso-
phers always insist on defining and redefining their terms.
86. This strategy presupposes the existence of a prelinguistic realm, some-
thing that many might dispute-perhaps even Wittgenstein. See supra note 36.
The size and shape of the prelinguistic realm may vary from individual to indi-
vidual. Personal experience suggests that some people claim to think in
words, while others claim that they must translate their thoughts into words
when they wish to communicate those thoughts to others.
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tions by maximizing correspondence between the concept and
its representation in the analytical context.
The relative advantage of literary language can be particu-
larly high in the context of contemporary analytical efforts. In
logical terms, modern conceptualizations of the type that are
relevant to legal, moral and philosophical problems can be suf-
ficiently complex that they elude binary or dichotomous exposi-
tion. Moreover, the reductionism required to describe complex
relationships as binary ones can be seriously distorting. Liter-
ary language, however, works through reliance on literary
devices such as narrative, metaphor, imagery, juxtaposition and
the like, rather than through expository descriptions.8 7 These
literary devices operate in a manner that is largely indifferent
to the degree of logical complexity inherent in the concepts
that they seek to convey. As a result, literary language is bet-
ter able than expository language to capture complexity. Fur-
thermore, in using literary language, translation of
multidimensional concepts into binary ones is unnecessary. Lit-
erary language, therefore, is likely to be of more use than ex-
pository language in analyzing the types of social phenomena
that are now being constructed to correspond to our current
perceptions about social reality.
88
Because literary language operates through the direct evo-
cation of potentially complex concepts rather than through at-
tempted exposition of those concepts, even ineffable concepts
can be incorporated into an analysis. Expository language is
simply of no use when confronted with a concept for which no
descriptive word or phrase exists. Words and phrases in their
own right are only marginally relevant to literary language,
however. Although words and phrases are used to create liter-
ary situations from which to evoke concepts, literary communi-
87. See L. CARTER, supra note 70, at 135-60 (analyzing law and dramatic
narrative); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward. Nomos and Nar-
rative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 4-10 (1983); see generally J. WHITE, supra note 80,
at 861 (discussing use of narrative). For a particularly effective example of
how an idea too complex to be captured in expository terms can nevertheless
be conveyed through literary techniques, see Bell, The Supreme Cour4 1984
Term-Forward: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1985)
("[R]esort to the unreal may lead us toward a realism needed to uncover, at
last, the real content of the racial complexity we call civil rights.").
88. For an appealing example of how literary language can permit a more
satisfying account of a complex concept-specifically, the concept of inten-
tion-than one would expect from expository language alone, see Frug, Henry




cation itself occurs on a prelinguistic level. As a result, the
absence of descriptive words and phrases does not preclude lit-
erary evocation of a concept. Limitations on the literary skill
of an author may well preclude successful evocation of a com-
plex or ineffable concept, but limitations in language itself are
unlikely to be relevant.
If the science fiction writers are correct, we will eventually
transcend any need for language at all, relying instead on the
direct telepathic communication of pure ideas. 89 Although lit-
erary communication is but a small step in that direction, it is
nevertheless a qualitative advance over expository communica-
tion. The present paradigm excludes literary communication
from the sphere of rational discourse, but that exclusion cannot
continue if we are to account satisfactorily even for the phe-
nomena that we are presently able to perceive. It must cer-
tainly be transcended if we are to retain any hope of ever
accounting for the more complex and elusive phenomena that
we will likely be able to perceive in the future.
C. LOGIC IN THE NEW PARADIGM
A modernist approach to logic would significantly alter the
nature of both premises and conclusions that we consider ana-
lytically acceptable. Logic is the system of rules that we use to
govern the ways in which premises are permitted to interact to
generate acceptable conclusions. Binary logic plays such a pow-
erful role in the analytical paradigm presently governing ra-
tional discourse that the terms logic and rationality have
become virtually synonymous.90 Like language, however, the
system of logical rules can be reconceived to facilitate more sat-
isfying analyses of contemporary social and philosophical
issues.
To provide useful guidance for analyzing the types of social
phenomena that we are presently able to perceive, a recon-
ceived system of logic will have to possess two features that
make it fundamentally different from the present system.
First, logic will have to recognize some role for the intuitive un-
derstandings that it now insists on excluding from rational
analysis. Second, logic will have to recognize an expanded
range of interactions as legitimate, including interactions that
89. See, e.g., I. ASIMOV, SECOND FOUNDATION ch. 1, First Interlude in I.
AsIMOv, THE FOUNDATION TRILOGY (1953).
90. The term "logical" is a synonym for the term "rational." See WEB-
STER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1960).
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are now considered logical impossibilities. Ultimately, a recon-
ceived concept of logic may not only permit more satisfying
analysis, but it may also permit an escape from the self-perpet-
uating logical cycle, thereby enabling us to get on with the busi-
ness of conceptual and analytical maturation.
In the present paradigm, logical rigor is the safeguard
against improper analytical deference to intuitions. The way
we know that the judge is deciding the case according to the
rules rather than according to personal biases and predisposi-
tions is that the process of logical deduction from general rules
to specific case outcomes eliminates, or at least significantly
reduces, opportunities for such intuitive factors to infect the
analysis. Yet, we also know that this is not really the case. The
logical manipulations undertaken in Part I illustrate that heavy
reliance on intuition is necessary to distinguish between legiti-
mate and illegitimate exercises of the logical method. Not only
does rationality fail to actually exclude intuitions, but it cannot
function without them.9 1 Nevertheless, because our system of
logic provides no formal role for intuitions, we presently have
no viable model of the way in which we make our rational
decisions.
A reconceived system of logic is likely to give explicit rec-
ognition to the necessary interaction between the present logi-
cal rules and the presently excluded intuitions.92 Although the
precise model of how the two will interact is presently unclear,
as long as we continue to think in terms of the logic/intuition
dichotomy, some provision for interaction almost certainly will
have to be developed. Ultimately, we may view intuitions as
controlling and will honor the present logical rules only to the
extent that they have intuitive appeal. Alternatively, we may
assign logic and intuition different conceptual jurisdictions,
with traditional logic governing one area of rationality and in-
tuitions governing another. Another possibility is that we will
ultimately come to view logic and intuitions as interacting in
some novel way, which we are as yet unable to conceive, that
successfully dissipates the tension between the two. Clearly,
however, a rational paradigm that tries to exclude intuition al-
together is now obsolete.93
91. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 121.
92. Arguably, this is what Rawls seeks to accomplish with his concept of
"reflective equilibrium." But see supra note 57.
93. The logic/intuition dichotomy is simply a special case of the ob-
ject/subject dichotomy. See supra text accompanying note 76. A satisfactory
resolution of the problems relating to how logic interacts with intuitions may
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The second feature that seems essential to a reconceived
system of logic is the ability to account for a broader range of
interactions between conceptual ideas than is possible under
the rules of the present system. Whatever the full range of
possible interactions ultimately proves to be, we are already
aware of one type of interaction that traditional logic cannot
tolerate. Because of its binary nature, logic cannot tolerate
interactions that involve anything other than binary truth val-
ues. We now recognize that binary reductionism entails too
great a loss of descriptive accuracy to continue as a limitation
on permissible modes of rational analysis.9 4 A reconceived sys-
tem of logic will therefore, at the very least, require the capac-
ity to deal with acute indeterminacy and simultaneous
contradiction.95
The logical dilemmas generated in Part I suggest that it is
possible to uncover internal contradictions and logical inconsis-
tencies in almost any formulation of a binary premise. Virtu-
ally any dichotomy can be made to break down if scrutinized
closely enough. This is true whether the dichotomy involves
something as mundane as the right/privilege distinction or
something as fundamental as the distinction between the indi-
vidual and society. In the present paradigm, our response to
this phenomenon has been to deny its seriousness because
denial is necessary to salvage the system's utility. Consistent
with modernist thought, however, a new paradigm would per-
mit us to reconceive the governing rules so that we would not
have to deny our perceptions of indeterminacy and simultane-
ous contradiction. 96
A paradigm governed by rules of logic renders nonlogical
thought impermissible for analytical purposes. But to evolve
beyond a paradigm in which rational discourse is confined to
logical thought, it is necessary to make analytical use of
nonlogical modes of thought. As a logical matter, therefore,
one can never escape an analytical paradigm that is governed
by logic because one can never engage in the mode of analytical
thought that is required to effect the escape. Indeed, the valid-
well transcend the distinction between the two. See infra notes 100-05 and ac-
companying text.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 48-60.
95. For example, it will have to allow something to be both public and pri-
vate at the same time.
96. See generally commentators cited supra note 75. For a suggestion that
aesthetic rather than deductive criteria should be used to evaluate the accepta-
bility of arguments, see L. CARTER, supra note 70, at 105, 110, 166-86.
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ity of this syllogism finds empirical support in the fact that we
have as yet been unable to surmount our domination by logic,
despite its obvious analytical inadequacies. We can never,
therefore, break out of the self-perpetuating cycle of logically
dominated rationality and move on to whatever more mature
forms of analysis may await us, without first accomplishing
something that is a logical impossibility.
Two things seem to follow from all this. The first is that
when we ultimately do effect our escape to a post-binary logical
paradigm, we cannot expect the route to be paved with tradi-
tional logical appeal. The second is that even though escape
may be a logical impossibility, once we have managed to effect
it, the impossibility will not much matter any more.
D. SECRET RIGHTS
A theory of rights in a reconceived analytical paradigm
could evolve free from the constraints imposed by language and
logic as we currently understand those concepts. Although lit-
erary language could be used to evoke a prelinguistic concept of
rights, the rights themselves could never be accurately de-
scribed in expository terms. In that sense they would be secret;
no one would be able to say what they were. Like many
secrets, however, everyone would know all about them. In-
deed, the prelinguistic nature of rights might well mean that
the degree to which their nature and scope could be compre-
hended would vary inversely with the degree to which they
were subjected to expository description. In addition, because
logic would no longer impose its binary restrictions, the coher-
ence of the concept of rights would no longer have to rest on
the troublesome distinction that we currently draw between
the individual and society. The dichotomy could be tran-
scended, and the mutually exclusive interests of both the indi-
vidual and society could be simultaneously advanced.
Moreover, the theory of rights that accomplished that feat
would be untroubled by the logical impossibility of it all. Cru-
cial to the evolution of a new-paradigm theory of rights, how-
ever, would be its ability to withstand the inevitable initial
pressure under which it would be placed to regress to the pres-
ent paradigm.
1. Literary Evocation
We have internalized a concept of rights despite the inabil-
ity of any available theory to describe the concept adequately.
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Whatever it is that we believe, we are unable to put it into
words. Although we can have strong feelings about the exist-
ence of a particular right in a particular factual setting, the mo-
ment we offer a linguistic principle to justify recognition of that
right, a counterexample can be imagined that is sufficient to
demonstrate the inability of the offered principle to account for
our intuitive recognition. As should by now be apparent, that
process can be repeated for any principle offered to justify the
recognition of any right. The failure of linguistic attempts at
description, however, does not mean that a perceived right fails
to exist. Rather, the right's intuitive tenacity indicates that its
existence simply occurs on a prelinguistic level.
In a reconceived analytical paradigm of the type suggested
herein, a theory of rights would not have to be reduced to a lin-
guistic formulation. The rules of decision emanating from the
theory would exist on a prelinguistic level and they would be
invoked and applied on that level as well. This would not only
avoid the distractions and distortions inherent in efforts to re-
duce operative rules to linguistic rules but, to the extent that
settled understandings exist, they could be applied in their
purest form, free from analytical manipulation.
Consider, for example, the plight of Robin Hood.9 7 He
stole from the rich and gave to the poor, while saving his coun-
try from tyrannical rule in the process. As a literary matter,
Robin certainly had a right to perform such good works with-
out being sent to the gallows for his efforts. If the concept of
rights means anything, it has to encompass the activities of
Robin Hood. Moreover, the Sheriff of Nottingham, although
vested with legal authority, had no right to impose overburden-
ing taxes on the peasants to fatten his own purse. And Prince
John had no right whatsoever to seize the throne of England.
By right, the throne of England belonged to Richard the Lion-
Hearted. All of these assertions are indisputably correct. Ask
any ten-year-old. Indeed, their correctness is clear even though
not a hint has been offered as to what the concept of rights
might entail. Insisting on additional exposition, however, may
complicate matters.
As an expository matter, the minute we try to articulate
the nature and scope of Robin Hood's rights, Robin could be in
a bit of trouble. In some circumstances, income redistribution
might be desirable, as might the prevention of improper usur-
97. For a discussion of the Robin Hood legend, see M. KEEN, THE OUT-
LAWS OF MEDIEVAL LEGEND 95, 174 (1977).
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pations of governmental authority. In pursuing those objec-
tives, however, Robin Hood mistakenly undermined social
stability and respect for law by failing to utilize the proper
channels for redress of his grievances. Moreover, even if one
were to concede that Robin Hood had proceeded in a morally
appropriate fashion, moral rights do not necessarily correspond
to legal rights. When the state's authority to conduct a civil ex-
ecution is at issue, the operative concept of rights must plainly
be a matter of legal concern.
In our present analytical paradigm, with luck and a good
lawyer, Robin may be able to beat the rap. His fate will depend
upon which expository version of his rights is ultimately se-
lected as controlling. In a paradigm governed by a reconceived
set of analytical conventions, however, my guess is that we
would just tell the jury the story and allow Robin's claim of
right to resonate on the same intuitive level at which the opera-
tive rule of decision resides-a level at which the linguistic
charges and specifications of the indictment would prove less
distracting. To be sure, Robin's fate would still depend on
which story the jury was told; disagreement about the facts is
always possible. For any given set of facts, however, the opera-
tive rule of decision can be applied more precisely by not trying
to explain what it is.9g
The present claim is not that difficulties in interpretation
will disappear if we stop trying to enumerate the characteristics
and limits of rights. Difficult cases will continue to exist, and
the extent to which even prelinguistic concepts are societally
shared will continue to be a problem.99 The present claim is,
rather, that any difficulties in interpretation that do exist are
likely to be exacerbated instead of ameliorated by expository
reduction and linguistic analysis. The foregoing reference to
ten-year-olds was intended to suggest that we have a great deal
98. The power of narrative in transmitting and evoking shared values has
not gone unnoticed by legal commentators. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 87, at
25-35 (discussing the creation of constitutional meaning); see also L. CARTER,
supra note 70, at 150-60 (using the example of dramatics). Heavy reliance on
narrative alone, in an effort to avoid distortions resulting from attempts at or-
ganizing perceived events, has also been advocated in other disciplines, such as
anthropology and history. See C. GEERTZ, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese
Cock-Fight, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 412
(1973) (anthropology); Lehman, supra note 40, at 1590-91 (history), and au-
thorities cited therein.
99. See M. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 1-9 (suggesting that the acceptability




of prelinguistic knowledge about rights. As ten-year-olds grow
up and learn to do analysis, however, the problems become
more difficult and the outcomes often change. The present
claim is that many of those changes and differences are nones-
sential, and that little evidence exists to suggest that they con-
stitute improvements. In a reconceived analytical paradigm,
unliquidated rules of decision may well be permitted to operate
in a manner that allows us to honor our rights without ever
having to say what they are.
2. Logical Impossibility
In addition to the problems posed by linguistic reduction, a
major reason that no satisfactory theory of rights has been able
to emerge in the present paradigm is that such a theory would
have to perform a task that is logically impossible. As already
discussed, 00 individual rights can be secured only through so-
cial control, which necessarily entails the denial of individual
rights. A theory of rights cannot, therefore, serve its purpose
without simultaneously defeating its purpose. Because of their
mutually exclusive, reciprocal nature, the simultaneous ad-
vancement of both individual and collective interests is a logical
impossibility. Yet, simultaneous advancement appears neces-
sary. No accommodation between the competing interests of-
fered to date has been satisfactory, and there is little reason to
believe that a better accommodation will be offered in the fu-
ture. Even a theory that manages to strike an acceptable bal-
ance in one particular case can do so only by resting on some
principle that may generate an unacceptable result in another.
By de-emphasizing the role of binary logic, however, a recon-
ceived theory of rights will be capable of simultaneously ad-
vancing competing interests, despite the logical impossibility of
doing so.10 1
The way to accomplish logical impossibility is to modify our
perceptions about it. If, as modernist schools of thought sug-
gest, reality corresponds to perceptions about reality, we not
only are able to modify our perceptions, but a modified set of
perceptions will be every bit as effective as a change in what is
traditionally viewed as objective reality. One way to perceive
the problem of logical impossibility away is to alter our percep-
100. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
101. Feyerabend goes so far as to advocate epistemological anarchism pre-
cisely so that creativity and progress will not be stultified by prevailing analyt-
ical habits and conventions. See P. FEYERABEND, supra note 53, at 17-28.
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tions concerning the problem. For something to be a problem,
we must perceive it to be a problem. We rarely worry about
the problem of discrimination based on hair color because we
do not perceive it to be a problem. Likewise, we rarely worry
about, or even take the time to understand, the devastating ef-
fects that Heisenberg uncertainty 0 2 has on the concept of logi-
cal impossibility; we have simply marginalized the importance
of the problem. If we no longer thought of the social world as
one permeated with inevitable conflicts between individual and
group interests, the conflicts would no longer exist, and there
would no longer be any need to seek an accommodation be-
tween the competing interests.
For example, part of the appeal of communitarian theories
of rights is that they arguably permit the conflict between indi-
vidual and collective interests to be transcended simply by ter-
minating recognition of the conflict. Once individuals cease to
be perceived as individuals and are perceived instead as indivisi-
ble aspects of the community that they comprise, there may no
longer be any basis for conflict.103 To the extent that such a
modification of perceptions itself seems impossible, its viability
is easy to demonstrate. Individuals are made up of a collection
of isolated organs, cells, molecules, atoms and subatomic parti-
cles. With respect to the component parts of an individual, a
liberal theory of rights is actually communitarian; it focuses on
the totality of the component parts rather than on the compo-
nents themselves in selecting the level of generality at which
interest maximization should occur. The shift from a liberal to
a communitarian theory of rights is simply a change in percep-
tions about the appropriate level of generality. 0 4 It is what Na-
than Hale did when he regretted having only one life to give
for his country. It should be no less understandable in the
present context than it is whenever an unselfish hero puts the
collective interests of the group ahead of his own interests.
Another way of dealing with logical impossibility is to shift
frames of reference. Animation, for example, makes it rela-
tively easy for an object to accomplish the logically impossible
act of being in two places at once. By drawing the object first
102. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
103. There are, of course, problems with this argument. See supra text ac-
companying note 28.
104. In this regard, see R. NOZICK, supra note 49, at 27-114, discussing the
concept of self in a way that makes the foregoing illustration seem less artifi-




in one place and then in another on alternate frames of an
animated film, logical impossibility can again be transcended.
If one looks at the individual frames of the film, the object
never appears in two places at once. If one shifts the frame of
reference by looking at the screen when the film is shown,
however, the object always appears in two places at once. °5
In the context of rights, simultaneous maximization of
competing individual and societal interests may also become
possible by shifting frames of reference. With a separation of
legislative and judicial power, for example, laws or constitu-
tional provisions can be seen as maximizing collective interests
because they can emerge only from a collective process. A judi-
cial decision, on the other hand, can be seen as maximizing in-
dividual interests, because it can only emerge from the
preferences of an individual decision maker. Other characteri-
zations of the legislative and judicial processes are possible, but
if we adopt a frame of reference in which those are the opera-
tive characterizations, we can, as through animation, transcend
logical impossibility. A judge deciding a case is no longer seek-
ing to ascertain legislative accommodation of competing individ-
ual and collective interests. Rather, the judge is, by definition,
maximizing individual interests while construing an enactment
that by definition maximizes collective interests. Although mu-
tually exclusive, both individual interests in personal autonomy
and collective interests in social control are simultaneously
maximized whenever a judicial decision is rendered.
Shifting frames of reference and modifying perceptions
about competing interests are means of managing the problem
of logical impossibility. Even better means exist though-
means that we have not yet imagined. Indeed, the very fact
that we were able to imagine the two techniques discussed sug-
gests that they are not exactly what we are seeking. Those
techniques evolved from the present paradigm. After a para-
digm shift, better techniques will be available, but by hypothe-
sis, we cannot yet appreciate them because we have not yet
shifted to the perspective in which they function. One thing is
likely, however. When we do manage to formulate an accepta-
ble theory of rights in accordance with a reconceived set of ana-
lytical conventions, avoiding the dilemmas embodied in our
105. This illustration was first offered in Spann, Hyperspace (Book Re-
view), 84 U. MICH. L. REV. 628, 645 (1986) (review of J. AGRESTO, THE
SUPREME COURT AND CONsTrrTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)).
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current concept of rights will seem so obvious that it will be
difficult to understand how we could have missed it for so long.
3. Regression
A theory of rights that is reconceived to satisfy a new set of
analytical conventions will necessarily be counterintuitive
when it is first formulated. As a result, considerable pressure
will arise to reject the theory as it is being developed, just as
pressure will exist to reject the new set of conventions itself.
Moreover, because the theory and the conventions will not only
be different, but will also embody a novel perspective, the
resistance will be that much greater.1° 6 If the new theory, and
the new paradigm out of which it emerges, are ever to take
hold, however, the resistance will have be resisted.
The most disturbing aspect of a new analytical paradigm,
especially one responsive to modernist concerns, likely will be
its insistence on the need to tolerate what we presently per-
ceive to be logical contradiction. Even those sympathetic to the
idea of a paradigm shift are likely to seek a palliative of one
sort or another. Tolerance of logical contradiction, however, is
almost certain to be a central tenet of a reconceived paradigm.
Accordingly, efforts to deal with logical impossibility by sup-
pressing its significance are likely to do more harm than good.
Such efforts may operate as a regressive force, tying us to the
safety of the present paradigm.10 7
To the extent that the critical literature currently being
produced by legal scholars and moral philosophers marks the
beginning of the hypothesized paradigm shift, much of it also
illustrates the danger of regression. Although it successfully
documents the inadequacies of the present paradigm, much of
this literature chooses not to transcend it. My suspicion is that
the only way to effect the transition to a new paradigm is to
overcome the pull of the old one. Accordingly, the most prom-
ising way to respond to perceptions of doctrinal incoherence en-
tails more than the generation of a new set of doctrinal rules or
106. In this regard, some of the reactions to relatively tame versions of crit-
ical legal studies have been unmistakably hostile. See, e.g., Carrington, Of Law
and the River, 34 J. LEGAL ED. 222, 227 (1984) (Dean Carrington's reaction to
the scholarship of Professor Unger); see also Martin, "Of Law and the River,"
and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL ED. 1-26 (1985) (re-
sponses to Carrington's reaction).
107. Embarrassingly, the two techniques offered above for transcending
the limitations of logical impossibility, see supra text accompanying notes
102-05, probably fall into this category.
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policy perspectives. Simply exposing reified visions of equality-
based democracy by replacing them with reified visions of ra-
cism, sexism, or political tilt cannot be enough. Nor can replac-
ing them with visions of nihilistic liberation or existential
despair be enough. As helpful as alternative perspectives might
be in our ordinary efforts to comprehend our social world, they
are almost certain to weigh us down in our efforts to attain a
qualitatively more satisfying understanding. In dissipating the
tensions generated by contemporary critical perceptions, those
alternative perspectives also dissipate the pressure to shift to a
new paradigm in which even mutually exclusive perspectives
can coexist.
CONCLUSION
The concept of rights is not coherent. It rests on a distinc-
tion between the individual and society that is ultimately un-
tenable. An individual right can never be asserted successfully
against the group because the group will acquiesce in recogni-
tion of the right only when the group's interest is to do so,
thereby depriving the right of its individual character. Simi-
larly, a communitarian right can never successfully avoid domi-
nation by individual interests because the community can act
only through individual agents, who will acquiesce in recogni-
tion of a communitarian right only when it is in their individual
interests to do so. As counterintuitive as the foregoing may
seem, it is a completely rational way of viewing our social
world, and it is a way in which the concept of rights is too prob-
lematic to play any comprehensible role. Although there are
other ways of viewing the world-utilitarian and deontological
ways-that are equally rational, the analytical paradigm that
governs our current conception of rational thought offers no
way of choosing among the competing world views to deter-
mine which is the most satisfactory.
The present paradigm depends heavily on language and
logic as the staples of rational analysis. Language, however, is
not sufficiently expressive to convey the ineffable concepts
found in our social world, and logic is too limited to permit the
range of interactions between those concepts that are necessary
to account for contemporary social phenomena. Accordingly, a
reconceived analytical paradigm must be developed so that we
can better understand the phenomena that we are presently
able to perceive. A new paradigm, structured around the cen-
tral tenets of modernist thought, offers some promise for over-
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coming our present analytical difficulties. In such a paradigm,
language is likely to be more literary than expository, so that it
will be able to evoke directly the ineffable concepts that the ex-
pository language of the present paradigm cannot satisfactorily
describe. Logic in the new paradigm is likely to be reconceived
to be more tolerant of presently prohibited interactions among
conceptual premises, including interactions that we now con-
sider to be logical impossibilities. Moreover, in the new para-
digm, formulating a theory of rights that transcends the
analytical dilemmas of the concept of rights in the present par-
adigm may be possible-although it may not be possible to say
what the theory is.
I suspect that the biggest difference between the present
paradigm and the paradigm into which it is evolving, however,
will be in the new paradigm's liberation of imagination. Our
tradition of rational thought is characterized most strongly by
its reflex rejection of anything that is presently inconceivable,
but a paradigm shift may leave us more open-minded. Modern-
ist tendencies to prescribe a heightened analytical role for per-
ceptions may constitute a move toward the new paradigm. A
paradigm shift will undoubtedly enable us to develop many
new perceptions that we cannot now anticipate. We may even
be able to perceive away the tension inherent in using a logi-
cally structured linguistic argument to advocate the reconceptu-
alization of language and logic. The new perceptions, however,
will not themselves be the essence of the new paradigm. The
qualitative advance that the new paradigm is likely to offer
over the old will consist of its novel ability to permit the analyt-
ical use of ideas that have not yet been imagined. In a sort of
conceptual hyperspace, we will be able to incorporate into our
analytical framework ideas that we will not yet have been able
to perceive even though we will not yet have perceived them.
Then, our analytical maturation will be able to proceed forward
in quantum leaps.
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